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THE PUZZLE OF FAMILY LAW PLURALISM

EREZ ALONI*

Family law is succumbing to pluralism. Scholars have celebrated
this trend as a desirable outcome of the struggle for marriage equality. And a
pluralistic family law seems to offer distinct benefits: more regimes than just
marriage, and greater room for choice within each regime (manifest by more
types of legally enforceable intrafamilial contracts). This Article exposes
counterintuitive facts that lead to a surprising conclusion: the legal changes
that scholars tout as increasing pluralism eviscerate the substance of the
choices families are permitted to make.
The policies that appear to extend choice within each regime, in
fact, mask what I call a “neoclassical” approach to intrafamilial contracts—
that is, an approach that adopts formalist, binary, and proceduralist principles
for the creation of legal obligations. As this Article’s scrutiny of prenuptial and
cohabitation agreements reveals, neoclassical contract theory is slowly
taking over family law. The neoclassical approach vindicates a thin notion of
autonomy over other values and favors the status quo. The Article further
contends that the roots of family law pluralism in market logic render it
fundamentally flawed: as long as the menu of relationship options is
predicated on basic contract law, then, regardless of how many options the
menu includes, the system will necessarily privilege the more economically
powerful partner.
Is it possible to avoid this perverse result while preserving freedom
of choice? The Article develops a more robust vision of pluralism by
identifying the goals and methods of pluralism in family law as they have
developed over time. In doing so, the Article offers foundations of a new
theory of pluralism that advances true substantive equality and autonomy.
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INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the struggle for marriage equality, legal scholars have
observed (and generally celebrated) that family law is moving toward
developing a menu of options for legal recognition of relationships.1 That is,
as an unintended consequence of the process leading to securing marriage
rights for same-sex couples, a new and more pluralistic regulatory regime
has emerged. This menu of options is two-dimensional. One, it consists of
more regulatory regimes than just marriage, including several registration
schemes for recognition of relationships (such as marriage, civil unions, and
domestic partnerships) and the option to establish financial obligations
between unmarried partners without registration. Two, there is greater room
for variety and choice within each regime. This flexibility is established by
multiple contractual instruments available for couples to organize the
financial obligations between them (such as prenuptial, postnuptial,
cohabitation, and separation agreements).2
Some scholarship has touted the movement of family law from an era of
privatization to an era of pluralism. As a descriptive matter, some scholars
argue that family law has already started incorporating the basic form of

1

See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE
FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 121 (2002); Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L.
REV. 573, 626 (2013); William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The GuidedChoice Regime of Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1891
(2012).
2
See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1884 (“The simultaneous contraction and expansion of
family law have usually not been treated in public discourse as related phenomena . . . .”).
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structural pluralism.3 Structural pluralism refers to the structure and
organization of the law.4 In the case of family law, it refers to the formation of
multiple options for legal recognition of relationships and to the wider scope
for innovation and choice within each regulatory regime. On the normative
side, scholars rely on different principles (utilitarianism, autonomy, and value
pluralism), but the claim is quite similar under each: to accommodate
people’s autonomy, or to maximize their overall well-being, the state must
facilitate a variety of regulatory options—tailored for diverse types of family
structures—that will enable partners to arrange the legal consequences of
their relationships.5 Extending contractual choice and enabling more flexibility
within each regulatory regime are also consistent with the role of the state as
facilitating couples’ (or individuals’) autonomy because expanding the variety
of substantive contractual arrangements that courts are willing to enforce will
enhance and countenance a nearly limitless variety of substantive
arrangements.6
However, is the development of multiple options for arrangements of
relationships truly a cause for celebration? Registration schemes have either
disappeared or played an insignificant role in the menu of options. This is
because several states, after they legalized same-sex marriage, decided to
abolish their registration schemes.7 For example, Connecticut, New
Hampshire, and Vermont eliminated such registrations after they legalized
samesex marriage, and Washington and California have restricted these
schemes
3

See id. at 1889 (“To be specific, American family law in the last century . . . has
moved toward a pluralist regime where each state offers a larger menu of options for
romantic couples, including those with children.”).[emphasis on original]
4
Structural pluralism is also a normative theory because the theory addresses (or
should address) three matters: (1) the object of pluralism—what institutions should be on
this menu, (2) the type of pluralism—what values should be encompassed in and
distributed by the menu, and (3) the justification for pluralism—why pluralism. Rutger J.G.
Claassen, Institutional Pluralism and the Limits of the Market, 8 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 420, 421
(2009).
5
For a utilitarian-based argument for structural pluralism, see Eskridge, supra note 1,
at 1887 (“The utilitarian approach accommodates our social pluralism in family formation,
such that the state recognizes a variety of family institutions, each tailored to different
circumstances and preferences.”). See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 372 (1986), for an
argument that autonomy requires an adequate range of choices. See Shahar Lifshitz,
Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal Relationships, 66
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1589–1601 (2009), for autonomy-based arguments on family law
pluralism relying on Raz’s work.
6
See, e.g., Jeffrey Evans Stake, Paternalism in the Law of Marriage, 74 IND. L.J. 801,
818 (1999) (“The menu of options should include all of the serious proposals. Since almost
anything that can be written into law can be written into an agreement, one way to offer all
of the good proposals is to allow private contracting.”); see also infra note 45 R and
accompanying text.
7
In the United States, typically, the legal institutions that were created initially as a
compromise in the legal struggle for marriage equality—civil unions, domestic partnerships,
and the like—were abolished after the legalization of same-sex marriage. See Aloni, supra
note 1, at 626. Some states (for example, Hawaii and Illinois) maintained their registration
schemes—but not only is this the exception, it remains to be seen whether couples are
actually going to use them. See Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, A Right Not to Marry, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 1509, 1519 (2016).
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to elderly couples only.8 And, in any event, such registrations are often
designed in a way that is not attractive to many couples—because the
registrations take the form of marriage with a different name—and hence are
hardly used by partners. Additionally, a few scholars have already criticized
the assumption that the multiple registration schemes advanced autonomy.9
Therefore, the reality is that what looks like structural pluralism is
predominantly manifested by the movement toward flexibility and choice
within each regulatory regime. Namely, the menu of options is developing
primarily in its second dimension by the increasing acceptance of a narrow
subset of possible agreements between intimate partners (options to
contract about financial obligations between married and unmarried
partners).10 In other words, so-called structural pluralism is reduced to the
intensification of ex-ante private rulemaking options.
If, then, private ordering and individual autonomy are the new
articulations of pluralistic structure, the question becomes what is pluralism
anyway— and how is it different from privatization? Scholarship cheering the
development of pluralistic family law has given the term “pluralism” different
meanings. Further, literature in the field of family law has failed to adequately
define the object of pluralism and the type of goods that should be bolstered
by structural pluralism.11 Therefore, I explore the various definitions of
pluralism and the way it has emerged, in some quarters, as a synonym for
individual autonomy.
For this reason, the important and unanswered question that emerges is
whether the law of intrafamilial contracts promotes or detracts from family
law pluralism. Although the debate about the pros and cons of private
ordering in family law is an old and much discussed one, private ordering is
now dressed up in a new costume: pluralism. I assert that the relationship
between private ordering and pluralism has received scant attention by
family law scholars and is inadequately theorized.
To better understand the relationships between structural pluralism and
private ordering I examine what types of values are promoted by private
rulemaking in the family. I use functional analysis, focusing on two types of
intrafamilial contracts: prenuptial agreements and cohabitation contracts.12
8

Same Sex Marriage, 2012 Wash. Sess. Laws 199.
See infra note 44 and accompanying text (surveying the main criticism on the
additional registration schemes as enhancing pluralism).
10
By “narrow subset,” I mean to indicate that despite the intensification of private
ordering in the family law system, courts still enforce only a particular set of promises (such
as those that define the financial obligations between the partners upon divorce) to the
exclusion of other possible agreements (such as agreements about the duties of the
spouses during the relationship). See infra Part III.
11
See infra Part I.
12
While I use the term “cohabitation agreement,” I acknowledge that, for the most part,
cohabiting couples do not execute such agreements and that courts use a variety of legal
theories to find financial obligations between unmarried partners. Yet, as I explain in Part
II.C, this is precisely the reduction and entrenchment of contractual elements in
9
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This examination analyzes the way that the contractual options function and
what values these options offer for couples.
This study makes a novel claim: the doctrines that govern prenuptial and
cohabitation arrangements enforce these agreements in a formalist,
proceduralist manner.13 The law purports to balance competing values but, in
fact, adheres to rules and formalities over standards and substance. For
instance, the doctrine nullifies agreements when formalities are not met and
reduces the court’s discretion to evaluate a contract’s fairness.14 Similarly,
default rules often favor the economically stronger partner and disadvantage
the vulnerable party—often the partner who invested more in the household
at the expense of career development.15 This system resembles the way that
classical contract theory has often worked for the advancement of the
economically stronger party.16 Consequently, building on another body of
scholarship in contract law,17 I call this trend “neoclassical.”
The neoclassical approach in intrafamilial contracts plays a double role.
In the doctrines governing prenuptial contracts, it serves to protect the
freedom of contract of the economically stronger party. Therefore, in some
jurisdictions, the doctrine takes a strong pro-enforcement stance, increasing
the predictability of enforcement. Conversely, in the law of cohabitation
contracts, the neoclassical approach functions to protect the freedom from
contract of the economically empowered partner.18 By imposing formalities to
create binding obligations between unmarried partners and instituting default
rules that bar financial obligations without contracts, the doctrine ensures
that the parties do not make commitments involuntarily.
The choice within informal relationships and marriage, considered alone,
does not tell the whole story about the values embedded in the system

family law that I critique: courts insisting on the use of ex-ante bargaining notions to find
obligations between cohabiting couples.
13
Some scholars still maintain that prenuptial agreements afford stronger protection
than other commercial contracts. They have not yet noticed the emerging neoclassical
trend that diminishes these protections by focusing more on procedural safeguards. Thus,
some literatures assume that contractual family law already encompasses a pluralistic
approach because the doctrines that govern intrafamilial contracts reflect a different
balance of values than other sorts of contracts do (by providing expansive protections to
vulnerable parties). See Hanoch Dagan, Autonomy, Pluralism, and Contract Law Theory,
76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 33 (2013). As I show in Part II.B, while it is still true that many
states employ heightened standards for evaluating the fairness of prenuptials, the new
trend is toward diminishing these stricter requirements, at least in terms of substantive
fairness.
14
See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1729 (1976).
15
See infra Parts II.B–C.
16
Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L. REV.
1131, 1135 (1995) (“[A] legal system that emphasizes freedom of contract . . . works
ultimately to the benefit of the already rich and powerful.” (footnote omitted)).
17
See Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283,
1285 (1990) (“The word ‘neoclassical’ . . . indicat[es] that neoclassical contract has not so
far departed from classical law that a wholly new name is appropriate.”).
18
See infra Parts II.B–C (describing the development in doctrines governing prenuptial
and cohabitation contracts).
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as a whole. I thus put these legal institutions in perspective by examining the
whole regulatory regime together. My conclusion, visualized in Table 1,19 is
that the overall regulatory structure systematically provides significant
freedom for the wealthier party to skirt the financial responsibility to support
an ex-partner while limiting protections for the less-well-off partner.20
Thus, I contend that structural pluralism, in its current form, is a cover for
market logic and inequality, or, at the least, that it lends itself to a free-market
approach. Further, the reincarnation of privatization under the disguise of
pluralism is not a coincidence. Rather, pluralism is construed in a way that
invites the incorporation of neoclassical principles. That is, the theory’s
plasticity and commitment to personal autonomy make it a comfortable
ground for adoption of laissez-faire policies that advantage the economically
superior partners, and create a false sense of security that there is, indeed,
“effective choice” in the name of pluralism.
Finally, I explore whether it is possible for family law to advance a truly
pluralistic vision of family regulation. I assert that as long as the menu of
options is predicated on notions of private ordering and ex-ante bargaining,
then, regardless of how many options we have, the powerful party is going to
triumph over the less-empowered one. That is, the shortcomings of the
pluralistic system are to some extent unavoidable in any regime that uses
private rulemaking to “supplement” marriage. I suggest that a truly pluralistic
law needs to be bounded by other core values such as substantive notions
of autonomy and equality.21
The Article is structured as follows. Part I frames the transition of family
law from an era of privatization to an era of pluralism and introduces the
basic assumptions of pluralistic theory as pertaining to family law. Part II lays
out a functional analysis of the values embedded by cohabitation and
prenuptial agreements—with an emphasis on the neoclassical nature their
doctrines are starting to adopt. Part III takes a panoptic view of the
interaction between the various institutions that family law offers and asserts
that the system fails to promote a balance of values. Part IV provides a
critique of family law pluralism and proposes a few baselines for the
development of a truly pluralistic vision of family law. The Conclusion
suggests the need to move toward a neopluralist theory of family law—one
that is cognizant of and committed to distributive justice.
19

See infra Table 1.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV (arguing that such structure is likely to include registration
schemes that are substantially different from marriage, change of default rules, and
adequate protections from strategic behavior).
20
21
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I. FROM PRIVATIZATION TO PLURALISM?
Pluralistic theory is on the rise in private law scholarship generally, 22
and now dominates the discussion in family law as well.23 “Pluralism” takes
a few different meanings and definitions in family law.24 During the 1990s,
pluralism, in the family law context, was used mainly to describe different
groups and their diverse community norms concerning marriage and family
life.25 This Part examines how pluralism evolved into a term that is used in
connection with choice and individual autonomy. It provides a modest
genealogy of the shift from status to contract that preceded the supposed era
of pluralism.
The embracing of private ordering by family law is not a new
phenomenon. It is part of a larger process, commonly referred to as the
“privatization of family law”—a development that started almost fifty years
ago.26 Legal scholarship is not entirely coherent on the link between the
privatization process and the newer pluralistic development: what are the
differences between privatization and pluralism? Was the privatization
process replaced by pluralism?27 This Part aims to provide an account that
frames and delineates

22

See, e.g., Steven J. Burton, Normative Legal Theories: The Case for Pluralism and
Balancing, 98 IOWA L. REV. 535, 538 (2013) (“[A]ll normative legal theories should be
pluralist.”); Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 1409, 1435 (2012); Roy Kreitner, On the New Pluralism in Contract Theory, 45
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 915, 915 (2012); Bertram Lomfeld, Contract as Deliberation, 76
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 8 (2013) (“A newer camp of scholars offers genuine pluralistic
multi-value theories of contract law.” (footnote omitted)).
23
See, e.g., Jessica R. Feinberg, Avoiding Marriage Tunnel Vision, 88 TUL. L. REV.
257, 259–60 (2013) (advocating for pluralistic progression in family law); Melissa Murray,
After Lawrence, BALKINIZATION (Jan. 15, 2013), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/01/ afterlawrence.html [https://perma.cc/7YR4-RDB3] (“If same-sex marriage was among the first
generation of issues to emerge in Lawrence’s wake, hopefully relationship recognition
pluralism will be among its second-generation progeny.”); see also Linda C. McClain,
Marriage Pluralism in the United States: On Civil and Religious Jurisdiction and the
Demands of Equal Citizenship, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTI-CULTURAL CONTEXT:
MULTI-TIERED MARRIAGE AND THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND RELIGION 309, 309–10
(Joel A. Nichols ed., 2012) [hereinafter MARRIAGE IN A MULTI-CULTURAL CONTEXT] (arguing
that “‘legal pluralism’ is hot” and examining what legal pluralism means in family law).
24
McClain, supra note 23, at 309.
25
One popular strain of scholarship in family law addresses the plurality of legal
sources that direct society, including religious tribunals and custom. Id. at 309–10; see
also Joel A. Nichols, Comment, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage Law: A First Step Toward
A More Robust Pluralism in Marriage and Divorce Law?, 47 EMORY L.J. 929, 932
(1998) (advocating for “robust pluralism,” which entails “state openness to and respect
for the internal norms and regulations of various faith traditions regarding marriage and
divorce”). As explained below, I focus here on a different kind of legal pluralism and do
not address the topic of religious diversity.
26
Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1444
(1992).
27
Brian Bix, for example, considers the expansion of private ordering as one of four
different developments that contribute (or could contribute) to the development of pluralistic
and more decentralized family law (the other three are: delegation to religious communities,
establishment of menus of options, and allowing couples the choice of law to

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\39-2\HLG201.txt

108

unknown

Seq: 1

Harvard Journal of Law & Gender

6-MAY-16

10:38

[Vol. 39

the connection between privatization and pluralism. To do this, it is useful to
briefly recount the privatization process that preceded and contributed to the
development of the supposed pluralistic shift.
In the past half century, family law has undergone a growing process of
privatization. The transformation of marriage—from an institution with
strong status characteristics to an institution with increasingly more
contractual components—was most notable in the rise of no-fault divorce,
which permits parties to exit the marital relationship without a showing that
the other spouse committed some type of marital fault.28 This progression
was further characterized by the replacing of most mandatory rules that were
part of the marriage contract with default rules, which allows partners to
define many aspects of their marriage contract.29
This process was accompanied by an age-old debate between
supporters of traditional marriage and scholars who viewed contracts as
“variable, private, and controlled by the will of the parties not that of the
state.”30 The former group argued that allowing spouses to tailor their
obligations would increase opportunistic behavior and lead to marriage
instability.31 For them, it is the state—not the parties themselves—that has
the control, and should maintain the control, to prescribe the obligations and
privileges attendant to marriage.32 The latter group viewed contracts as
synonymous with individual autonomy.33 Although several scholars have
offered sophisticated critiques of private ordering as representative of the
partners’ will,34 more commentators now salute the extended private
contracting in family law and even call for its expansion.35

govern their relationships). Brian H. Bix, Pluralism and Decentralization in Marriage
Regulation, in MARRIAGE IN A MULTI-CULTURAL CONTEXT, supra note 23, 60, 64–66.
28
See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA.
L. REV. 1225, 1235 (1998). This is not to say that the state released all control over this
aspect, as spouses still seek the state’s approval in order to dissolve the marriage.
29
Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1902.
30
Janet Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage (I): From Status/Contract to the Marriage
System, 6 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 1, 4 (2010).
31
See, e.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 28, at 1245 (presenting the arguments of communitarians regarding contractualization of family relations); Carol Weisbrod, The Way
We Live Now: A Discussion of Contracts and Domestic Arrangements, 1994 UTAH L.
REV. 777, 779; Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Autonomy,
Interdependence, and Couples of the Same Gender, 41 B.C. L. REV. 265, 265–66 (2000).
Other commentators argue that contractual approach to family law is always problematic
because parties do not tend to think in contractual terms. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman,
“Contract Thinking” Was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365, 1367 (2001).
32
See Singer, supra note 26, at 1446; Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts
and the Family Economy, 93 NW . U. L. REV. 65, 111–18 (1998).
33
See Halley, supra note 30, at 15 (“[T]he onset of contractual freedom between
spouses is seen as necessary for marriage to be free and equal.” (footnote omitted)).
34
See, e.g., Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in
the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV.
384, 384–85 (1985).
35
See, e.g., Martha M. Ertman, Exchange as a Cornerstone in Families, 34 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 405, 443–44 (2012) (concluding that the law should extend more opportunities
for private ordering).
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Recently, some scholars maintain, family law reached the era of pluralism,
both descriptively and normatively.36 Although scholarship does not address
this issue directly, the privatization process described above could be
characterized as a transition period that preceded the pluralistic progresssion.37 Distinguishing between the process of privatization and the
progression toward pluralism is not easy, among other reasons because
scholars use the term “pluralism” in different ways, sometimes ambiguously
and without clear definitions.38 And because private ordering is itself an
element of this pluralistic development (meaning, the pluralistic progression
is expressed, among other ways, with the growth of options for private
ordering).
Nevertheless, trying to account for this transition descriptively, the
expansion of options for legal recognition of relationships constitutes the
main development that demonstrates the assumed transformation from
privatization to pluralism.39 As a result of efforts to legalize same-sex
marriage, a few states now offer (or offered) more institutions for registration
of relationships, sometimes even open to nonintimate partners.40 The dual
development of an increased enforcement of private ordering and of multiple
registration schemes, coupled with the diverse family structures that exist
today in the U.S.,41 is the primary demonstration of the rise of structural
pluralism in family law: the idea that, in the past century, American family law
“has moved toward a pluralist regime where each state offers a larger menu
36
See, e.g., Bix, supra note 27, at 61; David J. Herzig, Marriage Pluralism: Taxing
Marriage After Windsor, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 3 (2014) (“Family law has accommodated
the new social pluralism through the creation of various new institutions to formalize
cohabitation among both same-sex and heterosexual couples.” (footnote omitted)).
37
Cf. Singer, supra note 26, at 1565 (suggesting that the privatization process could
serve as a “useful stepping stone to imagining and implementing a more just form of public
ordering”).
38
See, e.g., Bix, supra note 27, at 60 (arguing that pluralism as expressed by “growing diversity and decentralization of marriage options . . . could be a good idea.”). Bix,
however, does not define the term “pluralism”, but only provides alternative paths to
pluralism by focusing on different developments that lead to what I call structural pluralism.
See id.
39
Erez Aloni, Deprivative Recognition, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1276, 1302–09 (2014); see
also Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1884.
40
These registration schemes vary in their scope and the level of obligations and
rights they confer. For instance, in some states (Illinois, Hawaii) they are open to same and
opposite-sex couples, while in others they are limited to same-sex couples only (New
Jersey). See Aloni, supra note 1, at 591–93.
Eskridge also includes within the expansion process the opportunities to live in
nonregistered relationships and still incur some legal consequences; for example, the
option to cohabit (which was criminally prohibited in the past). Eskridge argues that “[i]n an
increasing number of states, cohabitation has become a reasonably coherent legal regime
that is not just a private alternative to marriage but is also a regulatory alternative to civil
marriage.” Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1934–35. While it is true that in all but three states
contracts concerning the financial aspects of relationships are generally enforceable, these
regimes still present significant legal problems. I analyze the shortcoming of cohabitation
agreements in Part II. C. See also Aloni, supra note 1, at 587 (discussing the short- coming
of establishing financial obligations between unmarried partners based on contractual
elements).
41
Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1892–94.
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of options for romantic couples, including those with children.”42 Bill Eskridge
observes that “American family law has long been more pluralistic than
most academics, virtually all policymakers, and all partisans have made it
out to be.”43 As stated before, several scholars have scrutinized the view that
multiple registration schemes—as construed in the U.S.—enhance
meaningful choice.44 The critique of the shortcomings of registration
schemes is familiar; in any event, it is safe to say that, at this point, the
supposed pluralism is presented primarily by ex-ante contractual elements. I
focus, then, on the other element of the alleged pluralism: the greater room
for variety and choice within each regime; i.e., the contractual component.
Indeed, within this shift to structural pluralism, private ordering plays a
significant role.45 Consequently, contract is the main tool that makes these
regulatory regimes more flexible and tailored to the specific needs of the
parties—not one-size-fits-all.46 For instance, marriage offers more plasticity
once partners have the option to choose covenant marriage or to execute a
prenuptial agreement.47 Private ordering also extends choice without any
registration, because parties can create their own obligations by contracting
42

Bix, supra note 27, at 60, 64; Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1889. To be sure, Eskridge
acknowledges that the current menu of options is incoherent and developed without
systematic thought by the legislature. He thus advocates for its improvement and further
development. Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1891.
43
Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1947.
44
Elsewhere, I argued that these registration schemes—while they have the potential
to serve as useful options for regulation of relationships and for a variety of family
structures—fail to provide meaningful choices because they do not address the concerns of
people who live in nonmarital unions. See Aloni, supra note 1, at 591–94. Mary Anne
Case further observed, soon after these registration schemes appeared, that the
registration schemes that existed then actually decreased the choices open to couples by
adopting requirements (such as proof of cohabitation or financial support obligations
between the partners) that were not required in order to obtain a marriage license. Mary
Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1772–74 (2005). More recently,
Janet Halley suggested that the evolving menu of options for recognition of relationships is
“less emphatic about choice, more regulatory, more governmental in the Foucaultian sense
than a real menu of options.” Halley, supra note 30, at 22, 33 (footnote omitted). Halley
contends that these legal institutions incrementally adopt marriage-like characteristics, and
if a couple chooses not to adopt one of them, the state can still ascribe financial obligations
to them, thus leaving less room for choice. Id. at 22; see also Melissa Murray, Paradigms
Lost: How Domestic Partnership Went from Innovation to Injury, 37 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 291, 296-300 (2013) (arguing that once domestic partnership became
marriage with a different name it lost its transformative value).
45
E.g., Michael J. Trebilcock & Rosemin Keshvani, The Role of Private Ordering in
Family Law: A Law and Economics Perspective, 41 U. TORONTO L.J. 533, 535 (1991)
(arguing that private ordering in family law is justified by increasingly secular and pluralistic
perception); Bix, supra note 27, at 64–66; see also Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy—Balancing the Individual and
Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 487 (1983) (“The claims arising from such an
unlimited spectrum of relationships would necessarily be contractual in nature, with no
overtones of Status as a source of obligation.”).
46
Aloni, supra note 1, at 607–09.
47
See, e.g., Lifshitz, supra note 5, at 1633–34 (arguing that covenant marriage fits
that pluralistic approach to family law because it extends the marital options).
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about it without registering their relationships.48 Private ordering in family
law, the argument goes, thus serves (and should serve) to extend people’s
choices in organizing their relationships, in a way that reflects that couples
structure their relationships in different shapes and sizes.
Normatively, family law pluralism means more than privatization.
Accordingly, the state must proactively promote choices that are as diverse
as possible (as long as these options are useful). The pluralistic paradigm
also assigns a different role for states’ regulation of relationships: from
establishing the norms that are attendant to marriage, to serving “primarily as
supportive of individual and community ideas of marriage (within limits).”49
But these descriptive and normative accounts of pluralism are
unsatisfying. I argue that, to date, family scholarship has failed to provide
coherent definition to family law pluralism.50 Some scholars use the term to
describe a movement away from marriage as the only regulatory regime
(and one hard to modify) and toward a variety of regulatory regimes
characterized by default and override rules.51 But if this is the definition of
pluralism, then how is it substantially different from privatization?52
Additionally, this definition falls short of indicating what types of values
should be embedded in and distributed by such menu.53 For example,
“structural pluralism” could mean
48

See Stake, supra note 6, at 818.
Bix, supra note 27, at 61.
50
A specific application of autonomy-based pluralism in family law is offered by
Shahar Lifshitz, but while he intends it to provide general guidance to family law, at this
stage, the particular work is focused on a pluralistic legal approach to regulation of laws
pertaining to unmarried couples. Lifshitz, supra note 5, at 1567 (“This Article addresses the
regulation of economic relationships between unmarried cohabitants . . . . ”). He offers a
normative theory that supports his claim that the legal regulation of cohabiting couples, and
to a larger extent family law generally, should follow pluralistic principles. Id. According to
Lifshitz, pluralistic theory in family law stems from the principle that the state should support
individual autonomy by creating different legal institutions that reflect the different types of
relationships. Id. at 1568–70. Based on these principles, he offers a unique legal institution
of cohabitation that results in a set of legal consequences that correlate with the type of
cohabitation. Id. at 1601–25.
51
Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1889–91. Other times, the term refers to a descriptive
(not normative) shorthand for legal tolerance, acceptance, recognition, and encouragement
of a variety of family forms and variations within particular family forms. See Feinberg,
supra note 23, at 259 (defining “pluralistic relationship recognition” as “the needs of the
diverse relationship and familial forms in existence today without regard to marriage
eligibility”); id. at 258–60, 279–85. Such definition is typically accompanied by the
assumption that structural pluralism—including private ordering—reflects a positive
development.
52
See generally Singer, supra note 26, at 1446–47 (characterizing privatization as
recognizing relationships other than marriage and allowing the partners themselves to
determine the consequences of their marital status).
53
Eskridge’s pluralism is essentially a vehicle to achieve other utilitarian goals. For
Eskridge, pluralism entails “a regime where there is more individual choice, but that choice
is channeled, or guided, by governmental nudges rather than by hard governmental
shoves.” Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1893 (footnote omitted). Eskridge submits that family
law serves three main goals, which sometimes are at odds: encouraging committed
relationships, creating an efficient and low-cost decision-making mechanism, and
protecting vulnerable persons. Id. at 1946–47. Family law pluralism, he posits, supports
achieving a balance between these goals. Id. at 1950.
49

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\39-2\HLG201.txt

112

unknown

Seq: 1

Harvard Journal of Law & Gender

6-MAY-16

10:38

[Vol. 39

that the state has to provide as many options as possible (free market), or to
try to provide a choice that still has a channeling effect, or to provide only
limited choice for the type of partnership that the state wants to encourage. 54
Finally, even if one agrees on the definition and goal of family law pluralism,
we still have to examine whether the developing structure actually achieves
its goals—or progresses in that direction. Thus, an additional gap in legal
scholarship that this Article aims to fill is an exploration of whether the
expansion of choice—structural pluralism—truly reflects pluralistic values.
And if the currently emerging structural pluralism does not reflect pluralistic
values, the question arises as to whether such an agenda is even
achievable, or whether pluralism is a suitable framework for family law
theory.
While family law scholarship has failed to probe the aims of structural
pluralism, scholars from other legal fields have put forward elaborate
theories of the definition and role of pluralism in private law that can provide
a productive basis for similar exploration in family law.55 Hanoch Dagan, in a
book and numerous articles,56 advances the most developed of such
theories. Dagan’s pluralistic theory relies on three paradigms of pluralism:
structural, value, and autonomy-based.57 Structural pluralism, as explained
above, is the vehicle that serves to advance pluralistic values. Value
pluralism argues that as the world is composed of a plurality of universal
goods, these goods cannot be ranked (incommensurable), and that often
there is conflict between them.58 Dagan’s autonomy-based theory is strongly
influenced by Joseph Raz’s notion of autonomy. According to Raz, in order
for people to selfgovern, they must have adequate and meaningful choices.59
Dagan then endorses a view that the pluralistic approach is grounded in
respect for diverse values or different balances of values, and in promoting
autonomy that can only be achieved by facilitating adequate and meaningful
choices between options.
When it comes to contracts, Dagan asserts that contract law already
embodies such structural, autonomy-based pluralism and should further
develop in this direction. Contract law is ideal as an embodiment of pluralistic
theory because it “is an umbrella of a diverse set of institutions, and each
institution responds to a different regulative principle—that is, each vindi54

See Aloni, supra note 1, at 599–601 (contending that the menu-of-option plan is not
coherent enough).
55
Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1024–35
(2011) (describing four property theorists and uncovering their commitment to value
pluralism).
56
E.g., HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS (2011) (suggesting a
pluralistic theory of property in service of liberal values); Dagan, supra note 13, at 19–20.
57
Dagan, supra note 22, at 1421–29.
58
GEORGE CROWDER, LIBERALISM AND VALUE PLURALISM 44–56 (2002) (defining “value
pluralism” based on four elements: (1) universal values (2) plurality (3) incommensurability
(4) in conflict); WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE
PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 5–6 (2002).
59
RAZ, supra note 5, at 398–99.

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\39-2\HLG201.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 1

The Puzzle of Family Law Pluralism

6-MAY-16

10:38

113

cates a distinct balance of values in accordance with its characteristic
subject matter and the ideal type of relationships it anticipates.”60
Dagan further states that a particular example in which contract law
already encompasses such pluralism is family law contracts—such as
premarital contracts and separation agreements. Family law contracts are
emblematic of a pluralistic approach because different rules govern the
enforceability of such family-related contracts in a way that reflects the
unique values underpinning them.61 While Dagan does not purport to explore
the role of pluralism in family law, he often makes reference to this area. 62
For instance, he repeatedly refers to marriage and family contracts as prime
examples of areas that already show some degree of pluralism and will
benefit from further embracing pluralistic principles.63
In what follows, I build on and extrapolate from Dagan’s work and
evaluate its suitability to family law to examine whether private ordering in
family law advances the principles of value pluralism. That is, I explore
whether the growing private ordering in family law provides effective choice
and embodies a balance of values and whether it is progressing in that
direction. In particular, in the next Part, I review which values are integrated
into each type of family law contract.
II. NEOCLASSICAL REALITY
This Part uses functional analysis to examine which values take
precedence in contracts that regulate the financial obligations between
intimate partners. A functional analysis focuses both on how the structure of
law shapes the parties’ use of such contracts and on distributional concerns
resulting from this structure. It enquires into who employs the contracts, who
has the incentive to enter into such contracts, which promises are enforced,
and what impact the bargaining process and default rules have on the
contracts’ content.
Particularly, I look at two types of family law contracts that are often
treated as distinct but today reflect neoclassical contract principles:
premarital and cohabitation agreements. I focus on these two because, in
both, the doctrinal changes that govern their enforceability have been
significant and rapid, and because both are symbolic of the emerging
structural pluralism in family law. It is important to note, however, that
although I explore these two types of agreements, similar principles are
embedded in separation contracts64— and, to some extent, in postnuptial
contracts.65
60

Dagan, supra note 13, at 20.
Id. at 35.
62
Dagan, supra note 22, at 1435.
63
E.g., id.
64
See Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women’s Freedom to Contract at Divorce: A Mask for
Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153, 1270 (1999) (arguing that in the context of
separation contracts “[u]nder the pretense of respect for the autonomy and the equality
61
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Since I conclude that the doctrines governing family law contracts adopt
neoclassical characteristics, I begin by laying out the basic principles of the
neoclassical approach in contract law. Section A thus introduces basic
principles of classical contract theory and its progeny, the neoclassicist
approach. Section B investigates the values that have unfolded in premarital
agreements. Section C then studies the values that enfold contractual
principles that regulate the obligations between unmarried partners.
A. The Foundational Assumptions of Neoclassical Contract Theory
Classical contract theory posits a regulatory apparatus grounded on the
clear intent of the parties to enter into the contract and, once a valid
contractual obligation is created, holding the parties strictly to their bargain. 66
In other words, the rules of classical contract theory make “contractual
liability hard to assume and hard to escape once it is assumed.”67 Classical
theory relies on formal requirements—such as writing and consideration—as
conditions to make the promise legally binding.68 Once these requirements
are met, the doctrines of excuse are construed narrowly to bind people by
their promises.69
In effect, the principles of classical contract theory give individuals
considerable power regarding their commitments while taking that power
from the courts.70 By instituting formal, acontextual, and rigid rules of
formation and excuse, the system principally curtails the discretion of the
judge and the jury, diminishes their ability to exercise their personal views,
and forces them to adhere to the rules.71 Rather than use a case-by-case
approach to inquire into the contract’s fairness, classical theory is grounded
in stability and predictability. The trade-off for this is that such a system binds

of women, contract doctrine and its application provide no remedy and leave women mired
in financial despair and resentment”).
65
Traditionally, and still today, courts are reluctant to enforce postnuptial agreements,
and scrutinize them more critically than prenuptial contracts. See Hoffman v. Dobbins, No.
24633 2009 WL 3119635, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2009) (“Postnuptial agreements,
with specific limited exceptions, are not valid in Ohio.” (citation omitted)); Sean Hannon
Williams, Postnuptial Agreements, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 827, 829 (2007). Nevertheless,
recently there is more of a tendency to uphold postnuptial agreements and equalize the
tests for their enforceability with those of prenuptials. Moreover, the recently promulgated
Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act specifically applies to postnuptial
agreements and subjects them to the same requirements as premarital agreements. UNIF.
PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 2(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013)
(defining marital agreement as “an agreement between spouses intending to remain
married”).
66
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 52–53 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed.,
2d ed. 1995); Franklin G. Snyder & Ann M. Mirabito, The Death of Contracts, 52 DUQ. L.
REV. 345, 362 (2014).
67
Robert E. Scott, The Death of Contract Law, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 369, 372 (2004).
68
Id. at 371.
69
GILMORE, supra note 66, at 50–53.
70
Snyder & Mirabito, supra note 66, at 362.
71
See Feinman, supra note 17, at 1286–87.
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individuals to their bargain with very limited regard to the fairness of the deal,
changed circumstances, relative bargaining power, or specific circumstances
of the case.72 Indeed, “[c]lassical contract doctrine generally makes little
concession for the bargaining power inequalities that plague consumers.”73
Neoclassical contract theory emerged as a critique of the classical
approach. 74 It rests on a balance between the classical contractual
principles— freedom of contracts and efficiency—with other values, including
fairness.75 The neoclassical approach adopts doctrines that are more flexible
and pragmatic. Like its predecessor, the approach is still grounded in
concepts such as “assent,” but it is more likely to address the realities of the
parties and their dealings.76 This approach defines the current mainstream
theory in contract law.77 However, as implied by its name, neoclassical
contract law has not significantly departed from classical contract theory.78 It
is still founded on the assumption that individuals are relatively autonomous
and undertake commitments under state intervention that ensures fairness.79
Such contract law still assumes, sometimes incorrectly, that contracting
parties act rationally, and it is generally pro-enforcement of the bargain.80
As I show below, the characteristics of neoclassical contract law are
gradually appearing in the area of family-focused contracts. While the
general structure of the law embodies the main principles of classical
contract theory—such as adherence to rules, formalism, curtailing judges’
discretion, and limiting alternative theories of recovery such as quasicontractual remedies—the system is more akin to neoclassical than classical
72
Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common Law, 28
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 16 (2004) (“The solution to these problems is to revert to a simple
model of contract based on an ideal market, strictly enforcing the bargains that parties
make . . . and certainly not evaluating the bargains for fairness.”).
73
Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—the Sliding Scale
Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 50 (2012).
74
John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 869, 870 (2002).
75
Feinman, supra note 17, at 1288.
76
Jay M. Feinman, Contract After the Fall, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1537, 1538 (1987).
77
Feinman, supra note 17, at 1285; G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern
Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 431, 496 (1993) (“Most scholars agree that, as a matter
of descriptive fact, our era is dominated by this neoclassical realist model, which is
characterized by a pragmatic mix of both firm rules and open-ended standards.” (footnote
omitted)).
78
Feinman, supra note 17, at 1285.
79
Id. at 1309–10; Andrew Robertson, The Limits of Voluntariness in Contract, 29
MELB. U. L. REV. 179, 182 (2005) (“The cornerstone of the neoclassic conception of
contract is the idea that contractual obligations are voluntarily undertaken by contracting
parties.”); see also Blake D. Morant, Law, Literature, and Contract: An Essay in Realism, 4
MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 12–17 (1998) (criticizing the neoclassical approach for lack of
treatment of racial and gender bias in contractual relationships).
80
See Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law Now—Reality Meets Legal Fictions, 41 U.
BALT. L. REV. 1, 13 (2011) (arguing that neoclassical contract law—which she calls
“modern”—still retains the main characteristics of classical legal theory). Some scholars
view the neoclassical theory of contracts as taking a drastic distance from classical contract
theory and incorporating a strong nonformalistic approach to contract principles. According
to this account, modern courts have rejected the neoclassical approach in favor of a promarket approach to contract enforcement. See Shell, supra note 77, at 495–519.
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theory. This is because, as I describe below, the system displays attempts to
balance between competing principles, and it is more flexible than classical
contract theory. Yet, the neoclassical approach is still deeply grounded in the
principles of voluntariness and autonomy and adherence to rules over
standards, as analyzed in the following sections.
B. Prenuptial Agreements
In this Part, I use functional analysis to explore the values that are
promoted by the use of premarital contracts. I outline the evaluation of
enforceability of premarital contracts in Subsection 1. In Subsection 2, I
survey and analyze the default rules of marriage dissolution. In the third
Subsection, I give a functional analysis.
1. Enforceability
The evolution of doctrines governing the enforceability of premarital
contracts can be roughly compartmentalized into three stages.81 The first
stage, the common law phase, extends from the early 1970s until the
drafting of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (“UPAA”) in 1983.82 In this
stage, courts moved from a policy of absolutely declining to enforce
premarital contracts regarding the consequences of divorce to a regime of
limited enforceability, characterized by strong caution in enforcement.83 In
the second stage, the UPAA stage—from the passage of the UPAA until
recently— states have varied greatly in their approaches. Roughly divided,
some states have treated premarital contracts similarly to conventional
contracts, thus adopting pro-enforcement approaches.84 In other states,
courts have required

81

Because states vary widely in their approaches to enforcement of premarital
contracts, this is a very rough division. See J. Thomas Oldham, With All My Worldly Goods
I Thee Endow, or Maybe Not: A Reevaluation of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act
After Three Decades, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 83, 83–84 (2011) (stating that there
are substantial differences between states’ approaches to enforcement of premarital
agreements). Despite this shortcoming, this categorization is helpful in observing the
emergence of a neoclassical approach, compared with the other approaches. Jeffrey G.
Sherman offered a somewhat similar evolutionary categorization by identifying three
“significant events in the shift toward routine enforcement of all prenuptial agreements . . . .”
Jeffrey G. Sherman, Prenuptial Agreements: A New Reason to Revive an Old Rule, 53
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 359, 394 (2006) (identifying the three significant events as: the Posner
case (1970), the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (1983), and the Simeone case (1990)).
His analysis, however, is slightly dated, as his article was published before a few recent
significant events that I consider here as part of the third stage.
82
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
83
See Margaret Ryznar & Anna Stepie˜n-Sporek, To Have and to Hold, for Richer or
Richer: Premarital Agreements in the Comparative Context, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 27, 35
(2009).
84
See Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 154–156
(1998).
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a heightened burden for their enforceability (strong procedural and
substantive fairness).85 In the third stage, the neoclassical stage, which has
just started unfolding, a new approach has started to emerge: legislators and
courts have begun to desert the substantive review of prenuptial agreements
and to adopt strong procedural safeguards, attempting to protect the
economically weaker party while increasing predictability of enforcement and
restraining judges’ discretion. The current New Jersey legislation and the
Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act (“UPMAA”) are emblematic
of these changes. Below, I discuss these three stages. The account of
stages one and two will be familiar to most readers, so I offer only a succinct
description of them.86
Until the seventies, courts declared premarital agreements concerning
divorce planning unenforceable on the grounds that they violated public
policy by encouraging divorce.87 Thus, only premarital agreements affecting
the distribution of property upon the future spouse’s death were enforceable.
However, at the beginning of the 1970s, courts started to uphold premarital
contracts concerning the obligations of the spouses upon divorce.88 Still,
most courts examined the fairness of prenuptial agreements more closely
than they would have under general contractual principles.89 In other words,
courts have employed both procedural and substantive tests to examine the
fairness of prenuptials, including a close inquiry of fairness at the time of
enforcement (as distinguished from the time of execution)—a.k.a.,
“secondlook” provisions.90
The second stage began with the promulgation of the Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act in 1983.91 The Act, or some portions of it, was adopted by
twenty-two states and the District of Columbia;92 it embraced a strong
proenforcement approach.93 The Act “facilitates treatment of premarital
agreement as essentially ordinary contracts . . . [and] reduces the high
burden of
85

See Oldham, supra note 81, at 88.
For excellent reviews of the development of enforcement of prenuptial agreements,
see Silbaugh, supra note 32, at 70–75 and Bix, supra note 84, at 145, 148–58.
87
Silbaugh, supra note 32, at 72–73.
88
See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970); Unander v. Unander, 506
P.2d 719 (Or. 1973).
89
Bix, supra note 86, at 154.
90
See, e.g., Button v. Button, 388 N.W.2d 546, 552 (Wis. 1986) (“If, however, there
are significantly changed circumstances after the execution of an agreement and the
agreement as applied at divorce no longer comports with the reasonable expectations of
the parties, an agreement which is fair at execution may be unfair to the parties at
divorce.”); see also Mallen v. Mallen, 622 S.E.2d 812, 814 (Ga. 2005) (explaining that in
evaluating antenuptial contracts courts consider whether the facts and circumstances
changed since the agreement was executed so as to make its enforcement unfair and
unreasonable).
91
See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
92
DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 842 (3d ed. 2012);
Oldham, supra note 81, at 84 (only thirteen states enacted the law without significant
changes).
93
See Bix, supra note 86, at 155.
86
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disclosure and conscionability . . . .”94 In fact, when it comes to review of
unfairness, the UPAA required a higher burden from the challenger than
conventional contracts require.95 This is because the UPAA coupled the
element of unconscionability with fair disclosure. Namely, under the UPAA,
an antenuptial agreement would not be enforced if it was unconscionable at
the time of execution and the affected party did not receive fair disclosure of
the financial status of the other party.96 Conversely, under traditional
contractual doctrine, each element alone (fair disclosure or
unconscionability) can serve as a cause for unenforceability.97
The third stage in the evolution generally demonstrates a trend toward a
regime of difficult entrance and difficult exit, and preference for rules over
standards, with an emphasis on procedural safeguards over substantive
ones.
In 2013, New Jersey amended its version of the UPAA in an effort to
strengthen the enforceability and predictability of prenuptial agreements and
protect them from review and possible recession by judges.98 Before the
revision, New Jersey’s law included a second-look provision, authorizing
courts to examine the fairness of the agreement at the time of enforcement.99
In addition, the law listed unconscionability as a stand-alone cause for
unenforceability. 100 The amendment, however, not only limits the
examination of unconscionability to the time of execution (and thus
eliminates the secondlook provision) but also narrows the scope of
unconscionability, defining four specific factors that determine whether or not
an agreement is deemed unconscionable.101 Under the provision of this
amendment, the party seeking to set aside the prenuptial must prove that
she did not receive full disclosure of assets, or did not waive the disclosure,
or did not have reasonable knowledge about the spouse’s assets, or did not
consult independent legal counsel (and did not waive, in writing, the
opportunity to consult one). Put differently, there is not substantive
unconscionability in New Jersey, only procedural. If the procedural
requirements were met, and the spouse entered voluntarily into the contract,
there is no way out. This amendment was motivated by clear animosity
toward judges’ discretion and by an attempt to strengthen the enforceability
of antenuptial contracts.102 The result is that, in
94

ABRAMS, supra note 92, at 840.
Bix, supra note 86, at 156.
96
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(A)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
97
Bix, supra note 86, at 155–56.
98
N.J. S. JUDICIARY COMM. STATEMENT, S.B. 2151, 215th Sess. (2012) (“This bill would
strengthen the enforceability of premarital and pre-civil union agreements.”).
99
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2–38(b) (West Supp. 2015) (deleted by amendment, P.L.2013,
c. 72).
100
See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:2–38(b)–(c).
101
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2–38(c)–(d) (“An agreement shall not be deemed
unconscionable unless the circumstances set out in subsection c. of this section are
applicable.”).
102
See Hearing on S2151 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 2012 Leg., 215th Sess. 1
(N.J. 2012) (statement of S. Nicholas Scutari, Speaker, S. Judiciary Comm.).
95
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New Jersey, challenging a prenuptial agreement is more difficult than
attacking a conventional contract.
Finally, the most noteworthy legal development in the field is the 2012
promulgation of the UPMAA.103 In drafting the UPMAA three decades after
the UPAA, the Uniform Law Commission responded to criticism of the UPAA
as well as to the wide variation among states in its implementation. 104
Fortunately, it did not take the extreme approach adopted by New Jersey;
rather, as described by two committee members, it aimed to strike a balance
between “informed decision-making and procedural fairness without
undermining interests in contractual autonomy, predictability, and
reliance.”105 Indeed, as analyzed below, the UPMAA takes a more balanced
approach than its predecessor. At the same time, as indicated in that very
description, the Act’s focus is more on procedure and informed
decisionmaking and less on substantial unfairness.
Like its predecessor, the UPMAA specifies that the agreement be in
writing and signed by both parties.106 However, the proposed UPMAA
changes, in quite significant ways,107 the causes of unenforceability that the
UPAA incorporated: One, the UPMAA strengthens the procedural
requirements regarding entrance into the contract. Under the UPAA, there
was no requirement of access to independent legal representation. This
presented a problem, as sometimes a prospective spouse would introduce
the agreement a few days before the wedding when the other party did not
have enough time to consult a lawyer and was under the threat of having to
cancel the wedding.108 The UPMAA sets forth that when one party did not
have a reasonable opportunity for representation, the contract will not be
enforced.109 To clarify, the UPMAA does not require independent legal
representation in each agreement but only ensures that the challenger had
reasonable time and financial means to obtain legal advice.110 If a lawyer did
not represent the party, the UPMAA requires the challenger to sign a clear
waiver of the rights that she is relinquishing under the agreement.111
103

UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013).
See Barbara A. Atwood & Brian H. Bix, A New Uniform Law for Premarital and
Marital Agreements, 46 FAM. L.Q. 313, 314–15 (2012).
105
Id. at 315.
106
Id. at 338.
107
Id. at 339 (“The standards for enforceability, however, diverge significantly from the
UPAA.”).
108
See Oldham, supra note 81, at 90 (describing cases in which the wealthier party
presents the prenuptial a short time before the wedding and conditions the marriage on
signing the prenuptial).
109
See UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2013). Section 9(b) defines what counts as available independent legal counseling. Id. §
9(b).
110
See id. § 9(b)(1)–(2).
111
Id. § 9(a)(3) (requiring that the agreement include a “notice of waiver of rights” or
“an explanation in plain language” of the rights that the challenger waived).
104
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Two, as previously stated, under the UPAA, a finding of
unconscionability required both that the bargain was unreasonable and that
the challenger did not receive fair disclosure of the other party’s financial
condition.112 The UPMAA uncouples financial disclosure from
unconscionability, thus compelling adequate disclosure of the partners’
financial situations as a stand-alone prerequisite for enforceability.113 It also
contains a separate provision allowing the court to refuse enforcement of the
whole agreement, or part of it, if it was unconscionable at the time of
execution— which means that the defense of unconscionability is more
easily available to challengers of prenuptials.114
Three, the UPMAA, unlike its predecessor, leaves the door open for
invalidation of antenuptial agreements based on changed circumstances
during the marriage that result in “substantial hardship.”115 Because the
drafting committee was divided about the need to have a second-look
provision,116 it decided to add such provision in brackets—meaning that the
provision is an alternative for states that would like to adopt it, but it is not an
integral part of the proposed law.117
So far, only two states have adopted the UPMAA and two others have
introduced a bill but have not finalized the legislative process, and it is
unlikely that many other states will adopt it. Of the two adopting states,
Colorado has done so without the bracketed section (the second-look
provision).118 Moreover, Colorado did not adopt the stand-alone
unconscionability ground. Rather, as soon as prospective spouses follow the
procedure set forth in the law, the part of the agreement that concerns the
division of property is deemed enforceable and there is no way to invalidate
it.119 However, Colorado still allows for evaluation of unconscionability at the
time of enforcement, but only as applied to spousal support and attorney’s
fees.120 In fact, when it comes to distribution of property, substantive
unconscionability is unavailable. Similarly, Mississippi, where the legislation
112

See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
See UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9(a). The Act states that a
party has “adequate” financial disclosure if: (1) the party receives a description of the
property income and liability that belong to the other party; (2) waives in writing such
disclosure; or (3) the party has or should have adequate knowledge of the property income
and liabilities of the other party. Id. § 9(d).
114
See Atwood & Bix, supra note 104, at 342.
115
UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9(f)(2).
116
Atwood & Bix, supra note 104, at 333.
117
UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9(f)(2) (allowing courts to refuse
enforcement if it “result[s] in substantial hardship for a party because of a material change
in circumstances arising since the agreement was signed”).
118
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-309 (2015).
119
Id. (“A premarital agreement or marital agreement or amendment thereto or revocation
thereof that is otherwise enforceable after applying the provisions of subsections (1) to (4)
of this section . . . .”).
120
Id. § 14-2-309(5).
113
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has only been introduced, chose (in its bill) the same system as Colorado
did.121 Conversely, North Dakota has adopted the whole act, including the
bracketed second-look provision;122 and D.C., which has only introduced the
bill, subscribes to unconscionability only at the time of signing, not at the time
of enforcement (i.e., D.C. did not adopt the bracketed section).123
What we see here, therefore, is the emergence of a new attitude in the
enforcement of premarital agreements. Before the emergence of this trend,
states could have been divided, very roughly, into two approaches: those
that took a strong pro-enforcement stance (for example, the thirteen states
that adopted the UPAA without significant changes124); and those that
offered robust protection, both procedural and substantive (for example,
states that adopted second-look provisions).125 What we see in the UPMAA
itself—and in some of the states that have considered or adopted it—is the
movement toward both an emphasis on procedural safeguards and a
reduction in substantive protection.
In conclusion, states still show considerable variation in their
enforcement of premarital agreements. However, it seems that the emerging
trend— demonstrated by five states that recently amended or are about to
amend their laws and by the general spirit of the UPMAA—is the progression
toward informed decision making and the abolishment or limiting of
substantive unconscionability. In Subsection 3, I analyze the consequences
of this trend. For now, however, to better understand why the law that
governs premarital agreements adopts neoclassical values, an examination
of the default rules of marriage dissolution is required.
2. Default Rules
Default rules are modifiable contractual terms that govern the agreement
in the absence of other agreements by the parties.126 The default rules of the
marriage contract are the state’s laws regarding division of property and
spousal support upon divorce. In the absence of a marital contract
(prenuptial, postnuptial, or divorce settlement) that modifies these default

121
H.B. 1042, 2014 Miss. Leg., Reg. Sess. (2014),
http://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/documents/ 2014/html/HB/1000-1099/HB1042IN.htm
[https://perma.cc/FGW3-ZSEF].
122
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-03.2-01 to -11 (Supp. 2015).
123
B. 20-0217, D.C. Leg., 20th Sess. (2013), http://lims.dccouncil.us/_layouts/15/
uploader/Download.aspx?legislationid=29377&filename=B20-0221-HearingRecord1. pdf
[https://perma.cc/4BGW-S5WU].
124
See Oldham, supra note 81, at 84 (listing the states that adopted the UPAA with
slight variations).
125
See id. at 103–11 (describing different approaches to substantive review of
premarital agreements).
126
Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 563, 565 (2006).
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terms, the spouses will follow the financial obligations established by the
state upon divorce.127
The study of marital default rules is sometimes separated from the
exploration of rules pertaining to enforcement of premarital contracts.128
However, the two topics—the contractual doctrine and the default rules—
cannot be separated because some default rules have a significant effect on
people’s incentive to contract and on the substance of the contract itself.129
This is especially true in the area of premarital contracts because the parties
are opting out of the state’s contract (unlike other contracts in which parties
opt into a contract). This Part examines the default rules of marital
breakdown.
Default rules have been changing in a way that favors the wealthier,
nonprimary caregiver partner.130 The rules tend to order division of assets
equitably in the distribution of property arena, but some rules still disfavor the
dependent spouse. In the spousal support arena, the developments are
toward strong restrictions of maintenance.131
By using the term “homemaker,” “primary caregiver,” or “dependent
spouse,” I refer not only to spouses who do not work outside the home, but
also, and primarily, to those who work the “second shift” at home or take the
“mommy track”—those who have invested more in the household, including
raising the children, and made sacrifices that are likely to result in lost career
opportunities.132 By doing so, I do not mean to ignore the reality that the
American family has changed significantly, and the typical household does
not consist only of couples that adopt traditional specialization of labor
arrangements. Indeed, there are various arrangements and bargains that

127

Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88 n.10 (1989); Scott & Scott, supra note 28, at
1306.
128
The UPMAA, for example, did not discuss the rules of distribution of property and
alimony or their effect at all. See Atwood & Bix, supra note 104, at 330–31 (reporting that
the mandate given to the UPMAA committee was limited to premarital and postmarital
contracts, despite expectation that it would include cohabitation contracts as well).
Similarly, typically family law casebooks discuss the two topics separately. See, e.g., PETER
N. SWISHER, ANTHONY MILLER & HELENE S. SHAPO, FAMILY LAW : CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS 567, 1003 (3d ed. 2012) (chapter 7 discusses “economic consequences of
divorce” and chapter 11 discusses “marital contracts: premarital and separation
agreements”).
129
See infra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of default rules on
the content of the prenuptial agreement); infra notes 263–270 (discussing the effect of
default rules on financial obligations between cohabitants).
130
See, e.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 28, at 1312–18 (suggesting that contemporary
alimony laws disfavor the spouse who undertakes the main home assignments).
131
J. Thomas Oldham, Changes in the Economic Consequences of Divorces, 19582008, 42 FAM. L.Q. 419, 433 (2008) (“During the past fifty years, equitable distribution has
become accepted in all common law states. Spousal support is less frequently awarded,
and when awarded, it is increasingly common for it to be for a fixed term, rather than for an
indefinite period.”).
132
See Oldham, supra note 81, at 124 (“In relationships where the parties raise children, the primary caretaker customarily incurs lifetime career damage.” (footnote omitted)).
For a discussion and statistics about “homemakers” and gender roles, see infra note 183
and accompanying text.
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partners make all the time. However, it is still the reality that, especially in
households with children, specialization of carework is still prevalent. Some
less-traditional family structures also embody this characteristic. “As with
different-sex couples, there are a number of factors that produce and
maintain power as well as gender in a same-sex marriage.”133 Studies show
samesex couples “still adopt default patterns of specialized labor within the
household, even while preferring a narrative of equality within marriage.”134
The complicated rules of the distribution of property upon breakup—in
community property states and common law states—come down to whether
the court divides the spouses’ marital assets equally or equitably. 135 Each
state has its own rules concerning what counts as marital property and
separate property (and thus not included in the pool that is divided).136 The
nuances of the rules governing division of property upon divorce are
complicated, uncertain, and hardly known to lay people, and thus may
prevent people from effectively protecting themselves in advance.137
The range of marital property available for distribution on divorce has
expanded in the past generation or so, and the trend is toward equitable
distribution.138 At the same time, a few significant rules still disadvantage
dependent spouses.139 For example, in 2009, Alabama enacted a law that
precludes division of retirement benefits when the marriage lasted less than
ten years.140 In Indiana, unvested retirement benefits are not considered
marital property,141 and because “pension rights frequently are the most
133

Allison Anna Tait, Divorce Equality, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1245, 1271 (2015).
Id. at 1268; see also KATHERINE FRANKE, WEDLOCKED: THE PERILS OF MARRIAGE
EQUALITY 208–24 (2015) (discussing the way that financial obligations of marriage, which
were tailored according to the needs of heterosexual couples, do not fit the type of
relationships same-sex couples form, and particularly the way that prenuptial agreements
that same-sex couples utilize differ from those executed by opposite-sex couples);
Elizabeth F. Emens, Admin, 103 GEO. L.J. 1409, 1436–37 (2015) (discussing the
distribution of administrative work within the household among same-sex couples and
noting that while they tend to split the work more equally than opposite-sex couples, some
aspects of administrative work are still divided unequally).
135
See Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 75, 100 (2004). Equal distribution means fifty-fifty division, while equitable distribution
requires fair division of the assets and retains more discretion to the judges in deciding
about the division. See Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division and
Alimony: The Division of Property to Address Need, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 868–87
(1988).
136
J. Thomas Oldham, Tracing, Commingling, and Transmutation, 23 FAM. L.Q. 219,
220 (1989).
137
See, e.g., Allen M. Parkman, Bringing Consistency to the Financial Arrangements
at Divorce, 87 KY. L.J. 51, 63 (1998) (arguing that “virtually any outcome is legally
possible”); John C. Sheldon, Anticipating the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law
of Family Dissolution, 14 ME. B.J. 18, 22 (1999) (“Marital property issues tend to be factintensive, and marital distribution statutes tend to be vague and to rely heavily on judicial
discretion.”).
138
See Oldham, supra note 131, at 429–30.
139
Tait, supra note 133, at 1272–85.
140
ALA. CODE § 30-2-51 (2011).
141
See IND. CODE § 31-9-2-98 (1998).
134
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valuable part of the marital estate,” this law creates a significant loss to the
homemaker.142 Except for New York,143 no other states recognize a license
or professional degree as marital property,144 and while some states have
some mechanisms for reimbursement of the other spouse’s contribution to
the relevant education, still others do not recognize the enhanced earning
that the license provides.145 As a result, “the husband . . . is permitted to
keep most of the assets accumulated during marriage, while the wife who
has invested in her family and her husband’s career is deprived of a return
on her marital investment.”146 In Georgia, the Supreme Court recently held
that property acquired during the marriage is presumed separate property
unless proven to be marital.147 This is contrary to the rules in all other
states148 and can result in unjust outcomes because it is difficult between
married couples to prove who acquired the property, and when.149
In any event, in many cases distribution of property is less of an issue,
as most couples do not accumulate significant assets;150 the more important
question involves interest in spousal support (the spouse’s future income). 151
This is especially true when the primary caregiver has lost career
opportunities resulting from sacrifices that she or he took as a result of a
bargain with her or his spouse; a job found at this later stage is not likely to
promise satisfactory financial security.152 When it comes to spousal support,
not only do courts currently grant fewer alimonies, but the alimonies are

142

Oldham, supra note 131, at 430. One study found that pensions accounted for
twenty-five percent of the parties’ total wealth on average. Id. at 434.
143
See O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 713 (N.Y. 1985) (recognizing a medical
license as marital property).
144
Margaret Ryznar, All’s Fair in Love and War: But What About in Divorce? The
Fairness of Property Division in American and English Big Money Divorce Cases, 86 N.D.
L. REV. 115, 126 (2010) (“New York is, therefore, in the minority in treating professional
licenses as marital assets . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
145
Id. (“Other jurisdictions may grant the nonprofessional spouse certain relief in limited
circumstances.”).
146
Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1115
(1989).
147
See Newman v. Patton, 692 S.E.2d 322, 323 (Ga. 2010); Dasher v. Dasher, 658
S.E.2d 571, 572 (Ga. 2008).
148
1 Equit. Distrib. of Property, 3d § 5:4 (“In states with no statutory presumption, the
burden of proof is still ultimately on the spouse who asserts that property owned by one or
both parties falls within the definition of separate property. Some courts have reached this
result directly.” (footnote omitted)).
149
Oldham, supra note 136, at 220 (“Problems relating to tracing are common in divorce
since most spouses do not keep property in the same form throughout a marriage.”); see
Frantz & Dagan, supra note 135, at 101–02 (“The ‘substantial evidence’ to overcome such
a presumption is rarely forthcoming . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
150
See ABRAMS, supra note 92, at 471.
151
See Jeffrey Evans Stake, Mandatory Planning for Divorce, 45 VAND. L. REV. 397,
403–04 (1992). But see Oldham, supra note 131, at 434 (“[T]he adoption of equitable
distribution may be becoming more significant over time, as more spouses have
accumulated property of some value during marriage.”).
152
See Stake, supra note 151, at 403–04.
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shorter term and of lesser amount.153 Even before the recent trend of
alimony reform, courts infrequently granted spousal support.154
The type of spousal support has also radically changed. Whereas
before, permanent spousal support was the prevailing rule,155 most states
now prefer rehabilitative spousal support: a time-limited order meant to assist
the nonworking spouse to become self-supporting.156 Furthermore, many
states now restrict permanent alimony to long-term marriages157 (e.g., twenty
years in Massachusetts).158 A few states are considering alimony reforms
that piggyback on Massachusetts’s reform.159 A recent Texas statute allows
courts to grant spousal support only in marriages longer than ten years, and,
even then, the duration of alimony for marriages of between ten and twenty
years cannot exceed seven years.160
In conclusion, the default rules of marriage, and especially the rules
governing spousal support, do not adequately compensate the person who
gave up employment opportunities in order to invest more in the household
and family.161 Now that we have surveyed and analyzed the rules of
enforceability and the default rules that govern premarital agreements, we
can move to explore how these rules influence the contracting habits and
usage of parties, and which values are primarily embedded within this
contractual instrument.
3. Functional Analysis
In this Subsection, I first ask who the primary users and beneficiaries of
prenuptial agreements are and to whom they may be detrimental. Then I
examine whether the neoclassical approach provides sufficient protection to
those who are potentially vulnerable to harm from prenuptials. Based on the
design of default rules (property distribution and spousal support), two main
groups have incentives to execute premarital contracts— i.e., to move away
from the property and support obligations suggested by the default rules.162
One, the wealthier partners (business owners and people
153
See Judith G. McMullen, Spousal Support in the 21st Century, 29 WIS. J.L. GENDER
& SOC’Y 1, 6–7 (2014).
154
See id. at 6.
155
Under an order of permanent spousal support, the payor pays until his death or until the
payee remarries.
156
See Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 22 (1989).
157
See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 135, at 119 (“Those few awards of alimony are almost
entirely time-limited.”).
158
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 49(b), (f) (2014).
159
McMullen, supra note 153, at 8.
160
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 8.051, 8.054 (West Supp. 2015).
161
See e.g., Penelope E. Bryan, Reasking the Woman Question at Divorce, 75 CHI.- KENT
L. REV. 713, 717–18 (2000); Scott & Scott, supra note 28, at 1316 (“Current alimony law
distorts these incentives by imposing on the homemaker a disproportionate share of the
financial costs of divorce.”).
162
C.f. Ryznar & Stepie˜n-Sporek, supra note 83, at 33. (“Premarital agreements may
be drafted to either significantly favor or disfavor the more vulnerable spouse upon di
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who expect to inherit family wealth also execute premarital agreements more
frequently than ever before)163 want to protect themselves from unpredicted
changes in the default rules.164 Likewise, they aspire to guarantee that their
properties—those they own pre-marriage and/or will receive by inheritance—
will remain theirs and not be transmuted from separate to marital, or be
subject to a court’s discretion in equitable distribution (as in “kitchen sink”
states).165 This group can also include people who remarry and strive to
protect their family assets.166 The second group comprises the primary
caregivers.167 Because, as shown earlier, the default rules of marriage
dissolution are construed in a way that does not adequately protect the
investment of the primary caregivers and compensate for lost career
opportunities, scholars and practicing attorneys alike agree that primary
caregivers have a strong incentive to execute a prenuptial agreement.168

vorce.” (footnote omitted)). These incentives can be theoretical—they assume that the
parties know the default rules and overcome other cognitive problems that prevent parties
from executing prenuptial agreements.
163
See id. at 61; see also Laura Petrecca, Prenuptial Agreements: Unromantic, But
Important, USA TODAY (Mar. 11, 2010), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perfi/ba
sics/2010-03-08-prenups08_cv_n.htm [https://perma.cc/P4KG-BAXD] (quoting American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers president, Marlene Eskind Moses, saying that “[i]t’s not
just something for the rich and famous any longer. It’s for people that have assets and/or
income that they want to protect”).
164
See Ryznar & Stepie˜n-Sporek, supra note 83, at 61 (“Premarital agreements may
also be more common among prospective spouses with significant income or age
disparities.” (footnote omitted)); Heather Mahar, Why Are There So Few Prenuptial
Agreements? 6 (Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus. Discussion
Paper Series, Paper No. 436, 2003),
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1224&con text=harvard_olin
[http://perma.cc/Q46D-DHRC] (“[E]ven if a couple finds the present divorce law desirable,
there is no guarantee that the law at the time of their divorce will not have been modified.”).
165
Oldham, supra note 136, at 219 (defining “kitchen sink” states as allowing the “court
to divide all property owned by either spouse at the time of divorce” (footnote omitted)).
166
Sherman, supra note 81, at 373 (“[P]renuptial agreements are more common for
second marriages than for first marriages.” (footnote omitted)); Ian Smith, The Law and
Economics of Marriage Contracts, 17 J. ECON. SURVS. 201, 208 (2003).
167
See Mahar, supra note 164, at 6.
168
See, e.g., Jeff Landers, Deciding To Become A Stay-At-Home Mom? Consider This
Cautionary Tale, FORBES (May 29, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jefflanders/2014/
05/29/deciding-to-become-a-sahm-stay-at-home-mom-consider-this-cautionary-tale/#1c3
f57a87fe4 [https://perma.cc/5U9V-5E96] (“[A] prenup or postnup is an absolute legal and
financial necessity for any woman choosing to give up paid work and all its associated
benefits, tangible and otherwise, to stay home with the children.”); cf. Stake, supra note
151, at 402–04, 415 (arguing that current spousal support rules pose a risk to the
homemaker and proposing that prenuptial agreements could ease this problem). Such
prenuptial agreement should compensate the partner who serves as the primary caregiver
for his or her sacrifices in giving up employment opportunity and guarantee that upon
divorce the caregiver will maintain a similar lifestyle to the one he or she had prior to
divorce. Alternatively, the prenuptial should allow the caregiver to catch up on the years of
lost networking, skills, and employment experience. In practice, such a prenuptial should be
tailored to the specific couple—depending on the type of lost career opportunities— but
generally such agreement should provide for a longer alimony period (than the one
warranted by the default rules) allowing the caregiver to come close to what he or she has
lost in the years of taking care of children and household. Additionally, such agreement
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However, the reality is that primary caregivers rarely use prenuptials to
protect their interests. Indeed, “somewhat paradoxically, it is wives in
traditional marriages that empirically are less likely to write a marital contract
even though they apparently have the most to gain from doing so.”169 In
accordance, ample evidence indicates that the majority of prenuptial
agreements are initiated by the economically privileged partners in order to
shield their assets.170 Concerning the substance of the agreement, Oldham
explains that “[s]ome limit the rights of the less wealthy spouse but still
provide significant financial recovery to that spouse if the marriage ends in
divorce. But many severely restrict or attempt to completely eliminate all
financial claims upon divorce.”171
A few reasons explain why primary caregivers execute prenuptials
infrequently— despite their strong interest.172 Some reasons for failure to
execute prenuptials agreements are applicable to both parties. For instance,
some partners may not be aware of the benefit of executing a prenuptial
agreement.173 Most people are ignorant of the complex rules surrounding the
financial consequences of marriage dissolution; 174 they assume that the
default rules will be more or less similar to their expectations.175 Relatedly,
many parties are too optimistic regarding the likelihood of divorce and thus
devaluate the potential benefit of a prenuptial agreement. 176 Further, drafting
can be costly.177 Parties can use boilerplates, but then they risk signing an
agreement that does not suit their needs.178 And some parties think that
suggesting a prenuptial signals that they are untrustworthy, or that they are

can include a mechanism for compensation for enhanced earning capacity incurred by the
spouse who did not give up career development (for example, stipulating that a
professional license is a marital property).
169
Smith, supra note 166, at 212.
170
See id. at 208; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY
LAW : STATE, LAW , AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND W ESTERN EUROPE 139 (1989)
(noting that prenuptial agreements “are nearly always used to insulate the property of the
economically stronger spouse, who in most cases will have the better bargaining
position.”). Indeed, as J. Thomas Oldham notes, “Although in rare instances a premarital
agreement provides additional rights to the spouse with fewer assets, the ‘stereotypic’
voluntary execution case involves this scenario: the wealthier party decides he or she
wants a premarital agreement to limit the other party’s financial claims if the parties
divorce.” Oldham, supra note 81, at 89 (footnotes omitted).
171
Oldham, supra note 81, at 103 (footnotes omitted).
172
See also Elizabeth F. Emens, Regulatory Fictions: On Marriage and
Countermarriage, 99 CAL. L. REV. 235, 264—65 (2011) (suggesting four reasons for why
the state could reasonably refuse to enforce contracts between romantic partners).
173
Mahar, supra note 164, at 9.
174
Id. at 7–8.
175
Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average:
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
439, 441 (1993).
176
See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of
Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 254 (1995); Mahar, supra note 164, at 9.
177
Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing
the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 461 (1998).
178
See Ryznar & Stepie˜n-Sporek, supra note 83, at 41 (analyzing the advantages and
disadvantages of using boilerplates in prenuptial agreements).
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opportunistic; others are uncomfortable raising these issues for other
reasons.179 While both partners may share ignorance and cognitive bias, the
result will typically be harsher for the economically disadvantaged partner.
Some other reasons explain why the primary caregiver is more inclined
not to enter into prenuptial agreements or will enter into a less favorable one.
Generally, even if partners execute an agreement, their over-optimism about
the longevity of their marriage may cause them to invest less in negotiating
ideal terms.180 Indeed, “Persons contemplating marriage are unlikely to view
the prospective partner objectively and may not measure the potential costs
and benefits of the marital state accurately.”181 Importantly, due to these
cognitive biases, couples may fail to insert provisions that will excuse them
from performance in cases of changed circumstances (for example, not
anticipating that they may lose employability).182
But not only are primary caregivers less likely to enter into protective
agreements, they are also more prone to be harmed by doing so. Despite
the potential of prenuptial agreements to protect the economically vulnerable
party, they could disadvantage that party in a few instances. This is true for
few reasons. One stems from the gender of the typical primary caregiver:
Primary homemakers, even if they also work outside the home, are still
predominantly women.183 The division of gender specialization also holds
true for wealthier couples—those who are most likely to use prenuptial
agreements.184 Meta-analyses of studies of women as negotiators
persistently show that women have different negotiating styles than men,
which may lead to detrimental results.185 Women are generally “less likely
than men to

179

See Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 177, at 461.
Smith, supra note 166, at 214.
181
Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L.
REV. 9, 63 (1990).
182
Id. at 82–83.
183
See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK
2 (2013), http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2012.pdf [perma.cc/AR25- 3HBX] (noting
that in 2011, 64.2% of mothers with children under six years did not work outside the home,
compared with 76.5% of mothers with children six to seventeen years of age, and 27% of
employed women usually worked part-time, while only 11% of men did); Ira Mark Ellman,
Divorce Rates, Marriage Rates, and the Problematic Persistence of Traditional Marital
Roles, 34 FAM. L.Q. 1, 20–26 (2000) (“[S]acrifices in earnings potential for the sake of the
marriage will be common even among wives who work full-time during marriage, and also
make it more likely that husbands will outearn their wives.”); Cynthia Lee Starnes, Lovers,
Parents, and Partners: Disentangling Spousal and Co-Parenting Commitments, 54 ARIZ. L.
REV. 197, 206–07 (2012) (“The primary family responsibilities that lead married mothers to
limit paid employment go far in explaining the motherhood penalty. Minimized investments
in the job market often mean less pay, less advancement, and, over time, reduced earning
potential as opportunities disappear.” (footnote omitted)).
184
Katharine K. Baker, The Stories of Marriage, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 25 (2010)
(“[T]he more wealth a married couple has, the more profound their gender specialization
tends to be.” (footnote omitted)).
185
Deborah M. Kolb, Negotiating in the Shadows of Organizations: Gender,
Negotiation, and Change, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 241, 242–43 (2013); Amy L.
Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?,
180
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ask, less likely to initiate negotiations, less positively disposed toward
negotiation, less confident, and more likely to set lower goals.”186 The
differences in bargaining styles are especially great when ambiguous terms
such as “equitable distribution” are involved.187 Furthermore, women
generally have more to lose from not getting married than men do because
their marriage prospects decline with age, while men’s age range for getting
married is longer.188 For this reason, some women may feel more willing to
enter into a marriage that includes a bad bargain than to begin searching
again for a partner.189
An additional important reason that prenuptials can pose greater harm to
the primary caregiver is that default rules create an endowment that limits
the effectiveness of the bargain. As Janet Halley points out, “‘[B]argaining in
the shadow of the law’—or at least, of what the spouses think the law to be—
does not emerge suddenly in divorce negotiations but rather permeates
marriage . . . .”190 Because parties bargain in the shadow of the default rules
even at the time of executing a prenuptial, it is unlikely that the homemaker
will get much more than the default rules grant her191 since those rules more
or less set the framework for what each partner expects to get. Of course,
the bargaining endowments do not exclude the option that the prenuptial will
grant more than the default, but at the least the default rules stand as a
general guideline for what the parties can reasonably expect.
For these reasons, primary caregivers may be better off bargaining
divorce settlements than prenuptial agreements. While the consensus
among scholars is that primary caregivers are better off bargaining before
marriage (compared with during marriage or upon divorce),192 this is not
always the

84 VA. L. REV. 509, 579–80 (1998) (citing research that suggests that women are not as
effective in negotiating as men are).
186
Kolb, supra note 185, at 243 (footnotes omitted).
187
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Deborah Small, Negotiating Divorce: Gender and the
Behavioral Economics of Divorce Bargaining, 26 LAW & INEQ. 109, 111–12 (2008).
188
Wax, supra note 185, at 545–56.
189
See id. at 650–52.
190
Halley, supra note 30, at 49 (emphasis omitted).
191
Cf., M.M. Slaughter, Marital Bargaining: Implications for Legal Policy 29, 40–41, in
MAKING LAW FOR FAMILIES (Mavis Maclean ed. 2000) (discussing the effect that
endowments have on the martial bargaining and arguing that social and cultural
expectations regarding gender roles in marriage pose a limit on women’s bargaining
powers in premarital agreements).
192
Some scholars suggest that women’s bargaining power to execute marital
agreements is better before marriage compared with negotiating during marriage or upon
divorce. See Smith, supra note 166, at 214–15; Kaylah Campos Zelig, Putting
Responsibility Back into Marriage: Making a Case for Mandatory Prenuptials, 64 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1223, 1229 (1993); see also Stake, supra note 151, at 419 (“Some, but not all, of
the benefits stemming from premarital contracts assume that negotiation is easier at the
time of marriage than at the time of divorce. There is reason to believe that early planning
is much less stressful.”). During marriage, the argument goes, women have more to lose
(for example, due to the decline in their earning capacity), which may incentivize them to
stay in the marriage even in return for a bad bargain. Similarly, upon divorce, women
generally face harsher financial consequences. See Pamela Laufer- Ukeles,
Reconstructing Fault: The Case for Spousal Torts, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 207, 233
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case. Taking into consideration the trend toward strict enforcement of
premarital agreements, the dependent spouse could, in some cases, be
better off negotiating ex-post (at the time of divorce) when the default rules of
spousal support are based on need.193 Because the alimony award is often
based on need, in the case of changed circumstances or when the couple
was married for a long time,194 a homemaker will likely fare better under the
default rules than under strict enforcement of a harsh prenuptial. With the
decline of second- look provisions—which would invalidate prenuptials in
cases of changed circumstances—people in long-term marriages with
children, or people who suffered unforeseeable events that reduced their
working capacity, may gain more under the default rules of support that take
into consideration need, employability, and the marriage’s longevity.195
Executing a prenuptial has other advantages—like saving transactional costs
of future litigation, which can be prohibitively expensive, and reducing the
accompanying acrimony196—but, even so, between the options of a difficult
divorce or being divorced without financial means, the former seems better.
Taken together, all these factors—over-optimism about staying married,
cognitive bias in predicting change of circumstances, different perspectives
on bargaining, more urgency to marry at a younger age, and limitation on the
substance of the bargain as a result of the default—can lead some
dependent spouses to enter into antenuptial agreements that disfavor them,
even significantly.197
(2010) (“[I]t is undisputed that women are worse off after divorce than men.” (footnote
omitted)); Matthew McKeever & Nicholas H. Wolfinger, Reexamining the Economic Costs
of Marital Disruption for Women, 82 SOC. SCI. Q. 202, 215 (2001); Scott & Scott, supra note
28, at 1317 n.214 (“In a traditional marriage, the homemaker wife, evaluating her reduced
future earning capacity and declining prospects for remarriage, is disadvantaged in
bargaining during the marriage.”). In addition, finding out before getting married that the
prospective husband is opportunistic can be a warning signal to the future bride; the
prospective bride can then choose a different partner while she still has good prospects for
getting married. Cf. Wax, supra note 185, at 651 (arguing that forcing parties to negotiate
before marriage makes for more efficient agreements because it may eliminate “the
possibility of opportunistic renegotiation or defection” and “expensive, inefficient self
protective behavior and underinvestment,” which may lead to women capturing greater
bargaining power, predictability, stability, and permanence). While this is a valid
perspective, it still does not render the deficits of bargaining before marriage—which are
suggested by this Article—less significant.
193
Cf. Scott & Scott, supra note 28, at 1307 n.191 (“Women who are less assertive
negotiators than men will be more likely to hold onto the default baseline than to bargain
aggressively in environments where legal claims are uncertain.”).
194
See Tait, supra note 133, at 1283 (“To begin, the low- or non-earner must often
pass a needs test in order to qualify for alimony.”).
195
Cf. Scott, supra note 181, at 73–74 (“Also troublesome is that events not
anticipated at the time of marriage may result in unfairness if precommitments are
enforced.” (footnote omitted)).
196
Stake, supra note 151, at 418 (“Setting aside beneficial effects on behavioral
incentives during the marriage and enhanced marital harmony, the reduced costs at
breakup alone might justify mandating premarital agreements.”).
197
See Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of Power, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
171 (2013) (arguing that the duress doctrine fails to recognize power imbalance and
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Against this backdrop, we can move now to examine the type of protection
that the neoclassical trend—and its focus on procedural safeguards—
provides. What the UPMAA approach—and to a larger extent the approach
of New Jersey and the few states that adopted or introduced the UPMAA—
suggests is a trade-off: stronger procedural requirements that aim to inform
the weaker party of her potential loss, in exchange for stronger predictability
of enforceability of these agreements, i.e., less power to judges to set these
agreements aside based on unfairness or changed circumstances. What the
UPMAA and the aforementioned states do not take into consideration are the
well-known deficiencies of mandated disclosure and procedural safeguards.
The rules governing prenuptial agreements assume that more
information will direct people to reach better decisions.198 But this proposition
ignores the real problem: even if people get full information, they can still
make bad choices. As stated recently by Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E.
Schneider, “A great and growing literature in social psychology and
behavioral economics documents the ways people distort information and
ignore and misuse it in making decisions. That literature teaches that you do
not solve the problem of bad decisions by giving people information.”199
Without mandatory legal advice,200 the procedural requirement of signing
a waiver does not remedy the cognitive bias inherent in the situation: it does
not assist with the parties’ over-optimism vis-`a-vis divorce that may cause
them to bargain less nor does it assist with the inability to predict
unanticipated contingencies in their lives.201 Even legal advice does not
guarantee that the prospective spouse will bargain wisely. As explained by
Jens M. Scherpe, “Even negotiating or renegotiating the terms of the
agreement

showing how such a narrow approach disfavors the weaker party in prenuptial enforcement
proceedings).
198
Cf. Atwood & Bix, supra note 104, at 332 (2012) (“[R]equiring that one have a basic
understanding of what he or she is waiving seemed appropriate as a matter of fundamental
fairness.”).
199
Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 647, 720 (2011).
200
As a reminder, the UPMAA requires access to independent legal counsel if the
other party was represented, but does not mandate representation—it only assures
accessibility. UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2013). Alternatively, if the party who forfeits rights was not represented, the agreement
must include a “notice of waiver of rights” or “an explanation in plain language” of the rights
being waived. Id. § 9(a). In addition, there is a requirement of fair disclosure of assets and
liabilities, unless the other party already has knowledge or a reasonable basis for
knowledge of the information. Id. § 9(d)(3). No doubt these rules help in assuring that
partners have more knowledge before signing a prenuptial. The rules will be effective in
preventing the somewhat common practice of a partner suggesting a prenuptial agreement
just a short time prior to the wedding.
201
With regard to the contingency problem, Elizabeth Scott suggests that it may be
mitigated by using standard forms and by background rules that define the conditions of
modification and excuse. Scott, supra note 181, at 85–90. The problem with Scott’s suggestion is simply that these background rules are disappearing (the diminishing of secondlook provisions). The only such background rule adopted by the UPMAA concerns
disregarding a waiver of spousal support that causes a party to be eligible for public
assistance. UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9(e).
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for many would seem a breach of trust and therefore might lead to the
(future) spouse accepting terms that he or she otherwise would not have
accepted.” 202 Indeed, as stated by an appellate court in New Zealand, legal
advice does “not protect one who ignores or disregards the advice.”203 Thus,
“even the best legal advice cannot be more than a safeguard, but never the
safeguard.”204
Further, the procedural requirements of antenuptial formation do not
address the limitations of bargaining in the shadow of the default rules. They
also do not sufficiently mitigate the disadvantage in many women’s
negotiating styles under the present adversarial system, and do not give any
weight to the general disadvantage that women face bargaining in the
shadow of the marriage market.
Not only do the procedural safeguards fail to offer sufficient protection to
the primary caregiver, but they are also likely to result in a diminishing review
of substantive unconscionability. Traditionally, in conventional contracts law,
courts have found unconscionability only when both procedural and
substantive unconscionability exist.205 However, often when full disclosure is
made, “an empty but formally correct disclosure can keep the contract from
being unconscionable, however problematic its terms.”206 This is already the
case in New Jersey and in Colorado (with regard to division of property):
when the parties meet the procedural criteria, they cannot raise any further
arguments concerning the fairness of the deal. It is likely that even in states
that would adopt a stand-alone unconscionability standard, as suggested by
the UPMAA, courts will be less willing to invalidate the agreement once the
parties have followed the procedural rules of executing a prenuptial.
The law and function of prenuptial agreements thus fit squarely within
the neoclassical approach. The law focuses on imposing requirements for
formation of contracts that aim to assure the parties’ consent to the
agreement. But the neoclassical approach disregards the reality of the
marriage market, the inequality of the bargainers, the design of default rules,
and unfair results.207 It also strengthens predictability while diminishing
judges’ dis-

202
Jens M. Sherpe, Marital Agreements and Private Autonomy in Comparative
Perspective, in MARITAL AGREEMENTS AND PRIVATE AUTONOMY IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 443, 495 (Jens M. Sherpe ed., 2012).
203
See Coxhead v. Coxhead (1993) 2 NZLR 397, 404 (N.Z.).
204
Scherpe, supra note 202, at 495.
205
Lonegrass, supra note 73, at 12.
206
Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 199, at 739.
207
See Blake D. Morant, The Salience of Power in the Regulation of Bargains:
Procedural Unconscionability and the Importance of Context, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 925,
947–48 (2006) (“Conspicuously absent from the [unconscionability] doctrine’s elements is
consideration of subjective factors related to power, class, gender, or race . . . . The
doctrine does not account for the parties’ pre-bargain attitudes and behavior that may
influence the terms of their agreement.” (footnotes omitted)).
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cretion and making the excuse of obligation more difficult—all characteristics
of neoclassical contract theory.208
In conclusion, the neoclassical trend adopted to alleviate bargaining
imbalance in the premarital-agreements context reflects another example of
the position, described by Duncan Kennedy as “center-left,” that focuses on
“eliminating inequality of bargaining power” but “has nothing to do with
eliminating factual inequalities.”209 As long as the procedural requirements
are met, those mechanisms’ primary purpose is to assure the enforceability
of the contract and reduce the power of courts to invalidate unfair
bargains.210 Parties can end up with a severely unfair bargain and the court
would not set aside the agreement because the formal requirements were
met. The spirit of the legal change is to make the weaker party aware of her
losses and then make the agreement enforceable anyway.
C. Cohabitation Contracts
While cohabitation contracts and premarital agreements are treated as
distinct topics—both in family law casebooks, as evidenced by their
organization into different sections,211 and in legislative work, as evidenced
by the work of the UPMAA committee212—the two have clear connections.
One main correlation is in the way that the rules that govern enforcement of
both types of contracts potentially influence people’s choices regarding their
relationship status and financial arrangements. That is, if cohabitation does
not warrant financial obligations between the partners without entering into
express contract, then some people who would like to protect their wealth

208

Cf. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 NW . U.
L. REV. 805, 808 (2000) (“[T]he rules of classical contract law were implicitly based on the
assumptions that actors are fully knowledgeable . . . . This model accounts in part for such
rules as the duty to read, whose operational significance was that actors were conclusively
assumed to have read and understood everything that they signed.”); Feinman, supra note
17, at 1286–87 (“When courts mechanically applied these abstract, formal doctrines, they
protected the individual’s right to assume contractual obligation or to avoid it at the same
time as they provided a predictable basis for commercial transactions.”).
209
Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law,
with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L.
REV. 563, 621, 624 (1982).
210
See Lonegrass, supra note 73, at 54 (“The conventional approach to
unconscionability is decidedly formalist. Requiring strong evidence of procedural
unconscionability maintains the ideal of freedom of contract by permitting judges to
interfere only in contracts that exhibit clear deficiencies in consent.” (footnote omitted)).
211
See, e.g., SWISHER, supra note 128, at 173, 1003 (dealing with “disputes between
unmarried cohabitants” in chapter 2 and discussing marital contracts in chapter 11).
212
Atwood & Bix, supra note 104, at 331 (reporting that the UPMAA committee wanted
to draft a law that addresses cohabitation contracts but was ultimately limited to premarital
and marital agreements).
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would be better off cohabiting than marrying.213 If, on the other hand,
cohabitation without express contract imposes financial obligations, some
people may be better off being married with a prenuptial agreement.214
Therefore, in order to form a more comprehensive understanding of the
gamut of regulatory choices for arranging relationships, it is necessary to
examine the rules governing informal relationships.
1. Enforceability
The rules guiding the enforcement of cohabitation contracts vary greatly
between states.215 State rules range from complete non-enforcement, to
enforcement of written contracts only, to enforcement of implied-in-fact
contracts and granting of equitable remedies. Since most readers will be
familiar with this account, this section will describe it only briefly, focusing
more on the evolution of the law and its consequences.216
As with premarital agreements, until the 1970s courts generally denied
enforcement of contracts governing the financial obligations between
unmarried partners, based on public policy doctrine.217 In 1976, the famous
Californian case of Marvin v. Marvin opened the door widely to enforcement
of such contracts and conceived the concept of palimony. 218 Not only did the
Marvin court hold, for the first time, that agreements defining financial
obligations between cohabiting couples are enforceable as a matter of public
policy, but the court also stated that “courts may inquire into the conduct of
the parties to determine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied
contract or implied agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some other
tacit understanding between the parties.”219 The Marvin court thus made
possible an expansive interpretation of contractual obligations between
partners, including those that derive from alternative theories of liability
based on unjust enrichment.220

213

See e.g., Blumenthal v. Brewer, 24 N.E.3d 168, 179 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (arguing
that refusing to enforce obligations between unmarried partners may “create[ ] an incentive
for some to not marry”).
214
Of course, the decision of whether to structure one’s intimate life in marriage is
dependent on many other considerations. Strategically, the choice between marriage and
cohabitation can be influenced by other factors, such as tax consequences of living in
marriage, the variety of benefits that are attached to marriage, or cultural preferences.
215
Halley, supra note 30, at 20.
216
See CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW , AND PUBLIC POLICY 38–
79 (2010) (detailing an excellent and comprehensive analysis of the legal treatment of
unmarried partners in the United States).
217
See id. at 48.
218
Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976).
219
Id. (citations omitted).
220
Halley, supra note 30, at 20.
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Today, all states except for three221 enforce written contractual
obligations between unmarried partners.222 In so doing, many states have
adopted a neoclassical approach for enforceability of such agreements.
Again, New Jersey provides the best example of such approach. Once
known (alongside California) for its liberal policy toward enforcement of
cohabitation contracts, 223 New Jersey recently passed an amendment to its
statute of frauds requiring that cohabitation contracts be in writing and that
both parties have independent legal advice prior to execution.224 Other
states, either by legislation or court decisions, require that cohabitation
contracts be subject to the terms of the statute of frauds.225 Still others—for
example, New York—enforce only express agreements.226 Furthermore, as
Cynthia Bowman points out, it is probable that “cohabitants are only slightly
more likely to obtain ‘palimony’ in California than in New York if the claim
rests upon an implied contract, and at least the courts in New York are more
candid about disallowing such claims.”227 While additional states enforce
implied-in-fact promises and recognize equitable theories for liability, the
general trend has been toward strengthening procedural requirements for
entrance into a binding legal contract, such that they are more restrictive
than those in other conventional contracts.228
Not only are the formal requirements heightened for creating a legally
binding cohabitation contract, the exit from such an agreement can be
difficult, too. The very few courts that have discussed express, written
contracts

221

See Long v. Marino, 441 S.E.2d 475 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Schwegmann v.
Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316 (La. Ct. App. 1983). The third state, Illinois, has for a long
time been resistant to the enforcement of cohabitation contracts, and that resistance is still
good law. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979). However, recently an appellate
court allowed unmarried partners to bring unjust enrichment claims. Blumenthal v. Brewer,
24 N.E.3d 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). In Mississippi, a valid precedent holds that “cohabitation
is prohibited as against public policy and that the Legislature has not extended the rights of
married persons to cohabitants.” Cates v. Swain, No. 2010-CT- 01939-SCT, 2013 WL
1831783, at *4 (Miss. May 2, 2013). Mississippi thus does not authorize ordering division of
property between cohabitants when the claim is “based upon a relationship.” Id. However,
the Supreme Court of Mississippi recently held that a cohabitant may recover the amounts
she contributed toward the purchase and improvement of one joint residence based on a
theory of unjust enrichment. Id.
222
See Aloni, supra note 1, at 587.
223
William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, “Palimony” Actions for Support Following
Termination of Nonmarital Relationships, 21 A.L.R. 6th § 10 at 351 (2007).
224
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:1-5 (West Supp. 2015).
225
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 513.075–.076 (2014); Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that cohabitation contract must be in writing); Kohler v.
Flynn, 493 N.W.2d 647, 649 (N.D. 1992) (“If live-in companions intend to share property,
they should express that intention in writing.”).
226
See, e.g., Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (N.Y. 1980).
227
BOWMAN, supra note 216, at 51.
228
Cf. Gregg Strauss, Why the State Cannot “Abolish Marriage”: A Partial Defense of
Legal Marriage, 90 IND. L.J. 1261, 1281 (2015) (“Despite their radical potential, the practical
significance of these new cohabitation doctrines should not be overemphasized. Reported
cases applying these rules are sparse, the courts have been hesitant to expand the rules,
and the courts tend to impose substantial evidentiary burdens for successful claims.”).
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between cohabitants have employed firm rules of enforceability and declined
to invalidate these contracts based on unfairness.229 For instance, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated clearly that it evaluates the
fairness of cohabitation contracts by a different standard than that of
prenuptial agreements.230 Accordingly, the court ruled that a cohabitation
contract that left a female partner destitute after twenty-five years of
cohabitation “is enforceable so long as it conforms with the ordinary rules of
contract law, and a court is no more entitled to inquire into its fairness and
reasonableness than it is in respect to contracts generally.”231
Finally, in several states the existence of the option to contract between
unmarried partners can abrogate the availability of a remedy based on an
implied-in-law contract.232 This is another basic principle deriving from
classical contract theory: “The binary nature of liability (either a contract had
been consented to or it had not) precluded the award of alternative
measures such as reliance or restitution damages.”233 Thus, as a doctrinal
matter, the option to contract about financial obligations can preclude the use
of quasi-contract theory.234 This is because unjust enrichment, as a doctrine,
is generally not available as an alternative to contract but, rather, imposes
liability when parties could not have contracted about the terms.235
The account presented so far does not purport to indicate that all states
have adopted such rigid approaches to enforcement of cohabitation
contracts. Indeed, some states recognize, and in fact apply, a variety of
theories of recovery to cohabitants upon dissolution. Yet in a recent opinion,
after a survey of the rules of enforcement in all states, a New Jersey
Supreme Court justice concluded that “because they are easy to allege yet
inherently contrary to fundamental legal concepts that have governed our
jurisprudence for

229
Cf. Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for
Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 255 (“If a couple has an express written
agreement, enforcement is usually straightforward.”).
230
Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 147 (Mass. 1998) (“An agreement between two
unmarried parties is not governed by the threshold requirements that apply to an
antenuptial agreement.” (citation omitted)).
231
Id. (citation omitted).
232
Cf., e.g., Slocum v. Hammond, 346 N.W.2d 485, 494 (Iowa 1984) (declining to
grant equitable remedies where no evidence of oral contract between cohabitants existed);
In re Estate of Alexander, 445 So. 2d 836, 840 (Miss. 1984) (recognizing that deceased
spouse wanted his partner to have an interest to his property but declining to grant any
equitable remedies in the absence of a will or a contract); Tarry v. Stewart, 649 N.E.2d 1
(Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (denying claims for unjust enrichment by cohabitants because the
claimant had already benefited from the relationship).
233
Feinman, supra note 72, at 5; see also Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to
the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s “Consideration and Form,” 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 94, 108 (2000).
234
See Emily Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice: Restitution Between Cohabitants,
77 U. COLO. L. REV. 711, 724 (2006) (“The second limiting principle holds that restitution is
not available as an alternative to contract. If the claimant conferred a benefit on the
defendant in the hope of payment, and could reasonably have negotiated for payment but
failed to do so, the claimant has no right to restitution.” (footnote omitted)).
235
See id.
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centuries, palimony claims must be viewed with great skepticism and must
be subjected to harsh and unremitting scrutiny.”236 Indeed, this determination
supports the argument herein that cohabitant contracts also tend toward the
neoclassical. The prevailing trend is to condition their enforcement on
formalities and reduce the availability of alternative theories of liability; once
the procedural requirements are fulfilled, it is difficult to excuse the
obligations.
2. Default Rules
When it comes to informal relationships, most states have adopted
default rules that declare that partners do not have financial obligations vis`avis one another unless they contract otherwise.237 Some states have also
adopted implicit default rules that domestic services provided during the
relationship are presumed gratuitous and do not merit compensation.238 The
reason, as articulated by a Connecticut appellate court, is that “the
household family relationship is presumed to abound in reciprocal acts of
kindness and good-will, which tend to the mutual comfort and convenience of
the members of the family, and are gratuitously performed . . . .”239
In two states, however—Washington and Nevada—courts have adopted
opposite default rules. In these states, if the couple lived in a “committed
intimate relationship”—established by such flexible factors as duration of the
relationship and the pooling of resources—they can apply the communityproperty law by analogy.240 Thus, if partners do not want to assume an
equitable division of property, they need to opt out in order to alter the default
rule.241
However, those two states are an isolated minority. To see how the
defaults operate in other states, consider the following case. In M v. F, the
partners lived together informally for thirteen years and had a child together.
242
During the time of the relationship, the male, a founder of a prominent
advertising company in New York, increased the company’s size from four to
thirty-five employees, with gross revenue of twenty million dollars. 243 The
partners lived together in Soho, Manhattan, in a loft purchased in 1997 with
the man’s money and under his name. According to the woman’s com-

236

Devaney v. L’Esperance, 949 A.2d 743, 758 (N.J. 2008).
See Scott, supra note 229, at 229.
Id. at 257.
239
Sullivan v. Delisa, 923 A.2d 760, 769–70 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) (quoting Cotter v.
Cotter, 73 A. 903, 903 (1909)).
240
Olver v. Fowler, 168 P.3d 348, 354 (Wash. 2007); Strauss, supra note 228, at n.
112 (“Nevada’s case law begins with implied-in-fact contract theory, Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d
672, 674-75 (Nev. 1984), but recent cases deemphasize the implied exchange in favor of
an inquiry into whether the couple ‘impliedly agreed to hold their property as though they
were married.’ W. States Constr., 840 P.2d at 1224.”).
241
Aloni, supra note 1, at 590.
242
M v. F, No. 350065/09, 2010 WL 1379034, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 23, 2010).
243
Id.
237
238

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\39-2\HLG201.txt

138

unknown

Seq: 1

Harvard Journal of Law & Gender

6-MAY-16

10:38

[Vol. 39

plaint, she was raising their mutual daughter and supporting his two children
from previous relationships, maintained the household, and was active in
providing ideas for his work (she had also worked in the field). Her partner,
according to the complaint, kept promising her “what’s mine is yours” and
made other promises to keep supporting her and sharing their properties. 244
Upon the couple’s breakup, the man refused to give her any rights to his
multiple properties, including their residence, and the woman sued for her
share based on a theory of constructive trust.245 While the New York
Supreme Court was “not entirely unsympathetic to the circumstances
described by the Mother,” it rejected her claim, stating that it is “longstanding law and policy in New York that unmarried partners are not entitled
to the same property and financial rights upon termination of the relationship
as married people.”246
3. Functional Analysis
In the context of cohabitation contracts, the neoclassical approach to
family contracts is doing the opposite work than it does in premarital
contracts: it protects one’s freedom from contract.247 The different approach
stems from the fact that marital contracts already warrant obligations
between the partners—thus, by executing a prenuptial agreement, parties
opt out from the marital contract and protect their freedom to enter into a
contract different than the one dictated by the state. Conversely, the rules
concerning cohabitation contracts protect parties from obligations to the
other party if they have not specifically delimited those obligations (opt-in
approach). This goal is achieved by the symbiosis of default rules and rules
of formation, which places the burden to opt in on the party who wants to
secure some financial obligations from the other partner (as opposed to
burdening the other party, who may want to avoid any distribution). The
design of these rules, I assert below, disfavor the weaker, less-informed
partner.
The rules of formation and default rules in this area are grounded in solid
rationales: mainly, that proving oral and implied promises between intimate
partners is costly and invasive, and courts encounter unique difficulty in
discerning the partners’ intentions.248 The doctrine also protects partners
from liability that they may purposely choose to avoid by not getting mar-

244

Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *2
246
Id. at *4 (citation omitted).
247
See Kennedy, supra note 209, at 568–70 (deconstructing the principle of freedom
of contracts into rules that permit freedom to bind oneself and rules that support the
freedom not to bind oneself without a will).
248
See BOWMAN, supra note 216, at 51; Brian H. Bix, Private Ordering and Family
Law, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW .
249
, 272–73 (2010); Scott, supra note 229, at 256–57 (“[T]he ability of third parties (for
example, courts) to discern accurately the parties’ expectations on the basis of their
conduct in this context is limited.”).
245
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ried.249 Thus, to protect parties from the ascription of obligations that they
have not voluntarily assumed, and to channel parties to express their
commitments clearly, the rules warrant that, unless otherwise contracted, the
parties do not have financial obligations vis-`a-vis one another.
But despite the fact that these rules are grounded in solid justifications,
the doctrine in effect strongly favors the most sophisticated party, whose
decision not to get married may be motivated by his desire to protect his
wealth.250 The set of rules concerning obligations among unmarried couples
leaves it to the weaker party to protect herself or himself by contracting to
create commitment.251 The problem is, however, that unmarried partners
often do not think in contractual terms and do not have sufficient
understanding of the rules surrounding legal obligations between unmarried
partners.252 Sometimes, as well, the partners do not know how their
relationship will develop and thus fail to protect themselves.253 Additionally,
signing a cohabitation contract can be costly and thus unavailable to the
economically weaker party.254 The weaker party can attempt to use
boilerplates that are readily available, but without knowledge of the rules, she
may be hesitant to sign one, or to sign what she may fear to be an unfair
bargain. Further, some people are unaware of the required formalities255 or
think that common law marriage—despite its significant diminishment—will
protect them.256
Reliance on contractual principles, and in particular on opt-in
requirements to create obligations, threatens to adversely affect the primary
caregiver in another way.257 The system ignores gender realities: women’s

249
See Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law
of Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 857 (2005) (“Under conscriptive rules,
individuals are no longer free to choose when, how, and whether to marry; instead, the
state—after the fact—decides for them.”); Lifshitz, supra note 5, at 1576 (arguing that the
choice not to marry may reflect an opposition to bear financial obligations and, “precisely
from the liberal approach, which stresses individuals’ intentions, it is appropriate to respect
their decision not to marry, and not impose upon them quasi-marital obligations” (footnote
omitted)).
250
Am. Law Inst., Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and
Recommendations, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 30 (2001) (“Failure to marry may . . .
reflect strong social or economic inequality between the partners, which allows the stronger
partner to resist the weaker partner’s preference for marriage.”).
251
See BOWMAN, supra note 216, at 228.
252
Ellman, supra note 31, at 1367, 1369; Lifshitz, supra note 5, at 1577–78 (“Typical
couples, however, are rarely consciously thinking of the legal aspects of their relationship.”)
(footnote omitted).
253
BOWMAN, supra note 216, at 52.
254
Cf. Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1976–77 (“[F]ew Americans have the foresight or the
resources to contract for all the possibilities that can arise in family relationships . . . .”).
255
See Carol S. Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on
the Value of Homemakers’ Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101, 135 (1976); Eskridge, supra note 1,
at 1979.
256
BOWMAN, supra note 216, at 231–32.
257
Cf. Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE
L.J. 997, 1107 (1985) (“[C]ourts can justify the failure to enforce cohabitation arrangements
as mere nonintervention, overlooking the fact that the superior position in which
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reluctance to bargain, their less attractive options in the employment market,
and their bigger loss from leaving the relationship.258 It does not address the
still-common situation in which female cohabitants devote time to caregiving,
contribute to household expenses, and so forth.259 Indeed, “the cohabitants’
unequal bargaining power leads to unjust results under contract theory.”260
The design of default rules—no automatic obligations without contractual
agreement—favors the party who would like to avoid commitment. As
explained by Elizabeth Scott, under current default rules, the economically
stronger party can hide his intentions regarding the financial commitment
between the partners.261 At the same time, the financially stronger party,
though promising that he will support his partner at the end of the
relationship, can make financial arrangements that advance his position
upon breakup (such as putting titles solely under his name). “In this way, he
reaps substantial benefits from the relationship, and then is protected by the
implicit default rule against financial sharing between cohabiting partners.”262
Setting the default rules this way also ratifies possible informational
asymmetry between the more sophisticated party and the less informed
one.263 Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner argue that in the context of informed
and less informed parties, the efficient way to design default rules is against
the informed party. In this way, they argue, a “penalty default” incentivizes
the informed party, who is interested in altering the default, to reveal
information about his intentions and the legal situation surrounding the
topic.264 If, however, the default rules are favorable to the informed party, he
will not have a reason to alter the default and to reveal his intentions. The
likely result is that the less informed party will not know about the rule and
the disadvantage it creates. Such design, they argue, encourages
opportunistic behavior by the more informed party.265 In the case of
cohabitation, the informed partner does not have a legal incentive to reveal
any information

nonaction tends to leave the male partner is at least in part a product of the legal system.”
(footnote omitted)).
258
Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28
UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1163 (1981) (“[T]he essence of a cohabitation or marriage contract
between heterosexual cohabitants is that the man gives up wealth that would otherwise
accrue to him in order to insure the woman some semblance of economic dignity. Selfinterest would lead the man to give up as little as possible. The woman has scant leverage
with which to persuade him otherwise. She lacks economic power. She needs a stable
relationship more than he does . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
259
See BOWMAN, supra note 216, at 227.
260
Blumberg, supra note 258, at 1163.
261
Scott, supra note 229, at 260.
262
Id.
263
Cf. Elizabeth S. Scott, Domestic Partnerships, Implied Contracts, and Law Reform,
in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 331, 345 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006) (discussing
unequal information or expectation between unmarried partners).
264
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 127, at 91.
265
Id. at 96–100.
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about his intentions regarding financial obligations. He can use the ignorance
of the weaker party (in terms of not knowing about the penalty) to avoid
obligations.266 If the rule were the opposite, the informed party would be
encouraged either to stay with the default (and thus be committed to
undertaking financial obligations) or to reveal his intention not to share
commitments— and let the less informed party decide whether to remain in
such relationship or not.267 However, because most states have adopted
rules that put the burden to contract on the less informed partner, the
stronger partner has no incentive to reveal any information and to negotiate
about the terms.
The defaults play another role in disadvantaging the weaker party, by
creating a shadow of endowments that limit that party’s possible
achievement. As explained by Russell Korobkin, “Contracting parties may
view the default term . . . as a status quo endowment” and not alter the
defaults because “their preference for maintaining the status quo relative to
alternative states swamps their preference for the alternative contract term
relative to the default term.”268 In particular, in the case of cohabitation
contracts, defaults reflect the assumption that carework and housework are
less valuable commodities than other, outside-of-the-home work. This is
because the defaults presume that housework is given gratuitously and
because some women tend to undermine their contribution.269 Thus, the
default rules also confer a bargaining disadvantage on the homemaker.270
Based on the function of the rules, it is safe to conclude that contractual
obligations between unmarried partners also adopt a neoclassical approach.
Construed with rigid rules of formation, diminishing the availability of other
bases of liability, and defaults that disadvantage the less informed partner,
these rules mainly support the autonomy of the couples to avoid ascription of
obligations. The neoclassical approach is helpful to the stronger party and
fails to protect the economically weaker party.
The bottom line, per this Article, is that the contractual choice embedded
in each of these instruments taken separately (prenuptial and cohabitation
contracts) provides choice that is more helpful to the economically stronger
partner. The contractual instruments seem better to reflect the values of
freedom of contract and predictability of enforcement over fairness and
distributive justice.

266

See id. at 99.
Scott, supra note 263, at 345.
268
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 608, 675 (1998).
269
Scott, supra note 229, at 257; see also Wax, supra note 185, at 583.
270
A modest change in the default rules could create significant improvement. For
example, Elizabeth Scott has suggested that the default rules be construed such that living
together for five years would raise a rebuttable presumption that the parties intended to
undertake obligations to one another. This rule would encourage the parties either to opt
out if they reject the commitment, or to accept the law’s assumption that the parties
undertook support obligations. See Scott, supra note 263, at 258–65. The main idea is
simply that a humble change in contractual rules can affect the reality of cohabitants
without imposing over-inclusive obligations.
267
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III. CHALLENGING THE MYTHOLOGY OF FAMILY LAW PLURALISM
Finding that principles furthered by premarital and cohabitation
agreements strongly favor contractual autonomy over other values—and
thus do not reflect the principles of value pluralism—still does not determine
whether the structure is antipluralistic. This is because a plausible view of
structural pluralism is that each institution on the menu reflects primarily one
value while other institutions integrate different values. That is, even if laws
governing prenuptial and cohabitation agreements reflect neoclassical
principles, other regulatory regimes on the menu (such as marriage without
prenuptials) embody other types of values—making the system as a whole
pluralistic. In this way, arguably, the system itself, with its various options,
reflects a more diverse set of values. In this Part, I thus examine whether the
plurality of private ordering options that exist in family law reflect—or
progress toward reflecting—the principles of value pluralism by offering
effective choice and incorporating a balance of values.
To see if the emerging pluralistic structure incorporates the principles of
value pluralism, we have to examine the system from a panoptic perspective:
looking at all the contractual instruments and legal institutions together. This
is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of choices that the system
extends because those choices determine partners’ behaviors in selecting
the institution that better fits them.271 Put differently, we also need to learn
how the different institutions interact with one another such that they channel
the parties’ choice.272
Isolating and evaluating the values that comprise the whole system is an
intricate task. Because the system embodies multiple incommensurable
values, we cannot put them on a single metric—so there is no quantitative
measure to segregate and weigh them.273 Thus, my methodology is to
examine the functions that the system serves in the regulation of
relationships.
Table 1 indicates the four main institutions and instruments that are
available for couples to administer their financial obligations vis-`a-vis one
another, and the values they bear. For each regulatory regime, the table
identifies how the default rules and the rules that determine formation and
enforceability of the contract influence the bargain. Importantly, while the
table’s rubrics reflect the general law in a majority of the states, when it
comes to enforcement of prenuptial agreements, the rules described in the
table and the following analysis are those of neoclassical jurisdictions, and
271

See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1977.
Cf. Aloni, supra note 1, at 606 (arguing that proponents of a menu of options failed
to explore the way that the different institutions on the menu affect couples’ choice in
selecting the right framework).
273
See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Kinds of Valuation: Some
Applications in Law, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON
234, 238 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997).
272

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\39-2\HLG201.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 1

The Puzzle of Family Law Pluralism

6-MAY-16

10:38

143

not of many states that still maintain a more balanced approach or those that
take a strong pro-enforcement stance.274

TABLE 1

Arguably, the menu of options—particularly in its contractual alternatives—
reflects the principles of value pluralism. Facilitating these multiple, flexible
options allows couples to exercise their autonomy by designing obli-

274
For a discussion of states that made it easier to contest an alimony waiver, see
Oldham, supra note 81, at 86–87.
275
Courts have traditionally refused to enforce agreements concerning obligations of
the spouses in an ongoing marriage, invoking the public policy doctrine. See Mary Anne
Case, Enforcing Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 225, 225
(2011) (“Courts in this country have generally been closed to those who seek judicial
enforcement of bargains or judicial resolution of disputes in an ongoing marriage . . . .”
(footnote omitted)); Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Public Policing of Intimate Agreements, 25
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 159, 192 (2013).
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gations that suit their relationships, the division of work between them, and
the particular weight that the specific individuals put on these values.
Structural pluralism, the argument goes, is compatible with the principles of
value pluralism because it is grounded in the notion that people appreciate
divergent kinds of valuations.
While this view is not completely without merit, it invokes a thin notion of
autonomy and misreading of value pluralism. Value pluralism has never
been an invitation to celebrate individual freedom over all other competing
values.276 Facilitation of diverse legal options that embed diverse modes of
valuations is not tantamount to embodiment of free-market principles. As
noted by Dagan, “[F]acilitation is rarely exhausted by a hands-off policy and
a corresponding hospitable attitude to freedom of contract. Rather,
facilitation requires the law’s active empowerment in providing institutional
arrangements, including reliable guarantees against opportunistic
behavior.”277
The current family law system fails to facilitate a functional structure that
infuses various and balance of values. Instead, the structure is grounded
predominantly in notions of negative autonomy: allowing the parties (rather
than the state) to determine the content of their obligations.278 The system
does not reflect a richer perception of autonomy, one that takes into
consideration the adaptive preferences of the parties, access to economic
opportunities and resources, and concerns about the end results of the
agreement.279 Indeed, choice and autonomy are not the same.280 Table 1
demonstrates that the system is mainly devoted to the preservation of
choice, but focusing on choice grants autonomy disproportionately to the
economically stronger partner. The type of autonomy that is most
emphasized in the structure is freedom of contract (including freedom from
contract).
The menu also fails to provide effective protection from strategic
behavior of the kind suggested by Dagan. The multiplicity of options allows
many opportunities for strategic behavior by the more economically
privileged partner while failing to provide significant protection to the weaker
partner. For instance, the partners can live informally and, despite promises
to the contrary (in the absence of a written contract), the economically
empowered party can leave the dependent party without any property or
financial support. If the parties are getting married, the weaker partner is in a
better position in terms of financial obligations than under all other
arrangements. However, this protection is gradually eroding as the defaults
benefit the financially stronger partner, thus leaving the economically weaker
276
See William A. Galston, Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory, 93 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 769, 777 (1999).
277
Dagan, supra note 22, at 1429.
278
MICHAEL J. TREBILOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACTS 9 (1993) (discussing
theories that “emphasize a more expansive conception of individual liberty that has both
negative and positive dimensions”).
279
See id. at 243.
280
Singer, supra note 26, at 1538–39.
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party with insufficient spousal support at the end of the relationship. Finally,
in both circumstances, express contracts will likely provide only minimal
benefits to the weaker party since the parties need only meet procedural
requirements and because the weaker party bargains in the shadow of a less
favorable endowment.
While the menu also embodies the notion of gender equality, this is
imbalanced and eroding. Commitment to gender equality is supposedly
reflected mainly through rules of equitable division of property in marriage. In
addition, a common argument is that private ordering allows couples to
structure their relationships in a way that diverges from traditional gender
roles281—thus, arguably, the menu supports gender equality by encouraging
the formation of family structures that transform entrenched notions of rigid
gender roles and parenthood. However, the unenforceability of contracts that
use non-monetary consideration such as housework devalues the worth of
such carework and allows less freedom in structuring the relationships in the
way that partners want.282 In addition, as argued before, while contracting
potentially allows the primary caregiver to improve her position (vis-`a-vis the
default rules), problems associated with bargaining power, the differing effect
of the marriage market on men and women, and devaluation of housework
have the potential to affect women disproportionately.
To be sure, the existing system represents an attempt to balance
between competing values. For example, as mentioned before, the trend
governing enforcement of prenuptials aims to balance freedom of contract,
predictability, and fairness.283 However, these efforts are reduced in the end
to a checklist of formal requirements that ultimately give precedence to
freedom of contract and predictability over fairness. Even when the system
mandates that the contracting party has full information but, due to cognitive
bias, lacks the capacity to evaluate the information, “it may often be
reasonable to conclude that choices made under such circumstances are not
autonomous.”284 Indeed, a system that is focused more on rules and
procedures, declares contracts legally binding once a procedural checklist is
satisfied, and disproportionately relies on autonomy, is closer to a monist
system and does not reflect the principles of value pluralism.285 Such
approach excludes the weighing of external factors—such as gaps in
bargaining power, gender, marriage market, educational background,
cultural differences, need, and so forth—that seem to be outside of the
scope of the courts’ examination.286
281

Matsumura, supra note 275, at 191.
See Karen Engle et al., Round Table Discussion: Subversive Legal Moments?, 12
TEX. J. W OMEN & L. 197, 220 (2003) (“Borelli re-entrenches the public/private split, denying
women economic rights based on the fact that much of the work we do is on the so-called
‘private’ side of this putative split.” (footnote omitted)).
283
See, e.g., Atwood & Bix, supra note 104, at 315.
284
TREBILOCK, supra note 278, at 243.
285
See Dagan, supra note 22, at 1410.
286
Leon Trakman, Pluralism in Contract Law, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1031, 1046–48 (2010).
282
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Conversely, a pluralistic court “can also invoke value pluralism to identify,
weigh, and rank checklist requirements, such as the intention to enter into a
marriage agreement against the fairness value of not enforcing onerous
terms in those agreements to the disadvantage of a dependent spouse.”287
One explanation for the limited success in providing effective choices
and protections for the vulnerable party is the adoption of the neoclassicist
approach, which favors form over substance and rules over standards. Such
an approach is antipluralistic because neoclassicism prefers freedom of
contract and autonomy while pluralism is committed to plurality of values,
including fairness and substantive equality. As noted by Duncan Kennedy,
“Formalities are premised on the lawmaker’s indifference as to which of a
number of alternative relationships the parties decide to enter.”288 In other
words, the parties are free to make their choices—as long as they signal that
these choices were made voluntarily. Formalities, thus, from their essence,
stand in contradiction to pluralists’ main claim: that the law should facilitate
meaningful choice rather than just assuring the parties’ will to enter into the
bargain is respected.
In conclusion, it is unlikely that a menu of options that is built primarily on
ex-ante bargaining between the partners will be able to advance a
meaningful pluralism—because it will continue to entrench the unequal
bargaining positions of the parties. The question remains, however: could a
structural pluralism achieve these goals with a different setting, or is the
problem that pluralism based predominantly on contractual principles will
always fail to accomplish its objectives? The next Part examines this
question.
IV. TOWARD A TRULY PLURALISTIC VISION
Can pluralistic theory—one that is not a fig leaf for neoclassicism—
serve as a normative foundation for family law? Put differently, is it only the
adoption of neoclassicism that fails pluralistic theory, or is pluralistic theory
problematic in and of itself? I propose that pluralistic theory, as so far
developed, while showing theoretical promise, also presents a few
weaknesses and risks. Ironically, the main shortcoming of the theory stems
from its strength: it is too elastic. This plasticity poses a risk: the adoption of
freemarket policies under the rhetoric of pluralism—a problem that is
exacerbated by the theory’s commitment to autonomy as a prominent value.
Dagan’s version of pluralism—and value pluralism generally—may be
too elastic to serve as a productive guideline for the construction of family
law. An essential characteristic of value pluralism is the notion that “the
ultimate values recognized by our community and by our law are irreducibly
plural; there is no single value that the legal system aims, or should aim, to
287
288

Id. at 1048.
Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1691.
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satisfy or maximize, nor can the variety of ultimate values be compared to
one another along a single scale or metric.”289 This character of pluralism
presents a question about its suitability to guide family law. If a plurality of
good values—at times, conflicting values—exists, and can generate multiple
and contradictory answers to a particular question—how can pluralistic
theory help in determining which values should compose the menu of
options?290 Just as one example: if autonomy is a good value, then the
system should hold people to their promises or respect their choice not to
enter into a contract—even if the result is less favorable to one party. But if
fairness is important, too, then it means that some promises should not be
enforced or that some obligations should be ascribed—perhaps even in the
face of a specific intention to avoid such obligations. The example is quite
simplistic, and yet raises the question: what is more important—autonomy or
fairness? And how can pluralistic theory guide policymakers in solving this
dilemma? The question thus is how much of fairness or equality versus
autonomy should the menu of options embed?
Hence, the problem with using pluralistic principles to guide family law is
that the theory (or theories) still does not provide any satisfying tools to
weigh which values will get precedence and in what way. Pluralistic theory
merely suggests that rational lawmakers can have multiple ways to balance
between conflicting values. While pluralistic theory does not entail that all
choices are permissible, it does endorse the creation of a wide diversity of
ways of life. “It condemns any law that totally precludes citizens from
pursuing one of the necessary basic goods. It also condemns any law that
prohibits citizens from instantiating a basic good in the only mode of which
they are capable.”291 Thus, “[i]t does not tell lawmakers which rationally

289
David Wolitz, Indeterminacy, Value Pluralism, and Tragic Cases, 62 BUFF. L. REV.
529, 531 (2014) (footnote omitted). Indeed, as argued by Michael Stocker, “‘Plural values’ .
. . mean pretty much the same as ‘incommensurable values.’” Michael Stocker, Abstract
and Concrete Value: Plurality, Conflict, and Maximization, in INCOMMENSURABILITY,
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, 196, 203 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997).
290
Brett G. Scharffs, Adjudication and the Problems of Incommensurability, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1367, 1372 (2001) (“The problems of incommensurability arise when we try
to compare plural, irreducible, and conflicting values, or choose between options that
exhibit or will result in the realization of plural, irreducible, and conflicting values.” (footnote
omitted)). Thus, some argue incommensurability presents a dilemma of rational choice
when the lawmaker must decide between two options that are not commensurable. The
question of whether incommensurability (or incomparability) of values precludes rational
choice has been the subject of debate among philosophers for years and is far from being
resolved. See, e.g., id. (“Incommensurability has been the focus of a sophisticated and
technical debate in academic philosophy, where several books have been devoted to the
subject.”); Sunstein, supra note 273, at 13–34 (surveying seven types of leading
incomparability arguments and asserting that none is compelling). For the purpose of this
Article, it is unnecessary to examine the various accounts. Rather, suffice it to note that
even if incommensurability does not present a problem of rational choice, value pluralism,
as so far developed, still does not tell much about how to balance and accommodate these
competing values.
291
Henry S. Mather, Law-Making and Incommensurability, 47 MCGILL L.J. 345, 378
(2002).
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permissible resolution they should prefer.”292 Because pluralistic theory is
amenable to so many compositions, it does not provide sufficient guidance
for construction and evaluation of family law.
Value pluralism does help to explain that different couples hold different
valuations for their relationships, and the state should facilitate choices that
affirm diverse kinds of valuations. Structural pluralism is the mechanism to
accommodate this idea of providing a “diversity of spousal institutions.” 293
No doubt, the notion that the law ought to recognize a variety of family
structures—and in order to do that needs to offer a plurality of suitable
options—is of great significance.294 In addition, while pluralistic principles do
not offer one answer to a policy dilemma, in a world in which goods are
incommensurable and often in conflict, pluralism can help to infuse family
law doctrine by fleshing out the alternatives (instead of looking at one
alternative, we might look at a few alternatives where different possibilities
are acceptable in a liberal democracy). For instance, when deciding whether
recognition of non-marital unions is desirable, pluralistic theory can guide the
policymaker toward creating a range of options that will allow diverse types
of family structures to tailor the obligations with some room to innovate but
still promise financial security.295
However, beyond these contributions, pluralistic theory does not add
much to an ongoing debate about private ordering and the choice of
regulatory framework in family law.296 In particular, the main and most
fiercely debated question that has occupied family law in the past decade
has been which types of families will get the recognition and protection of the
law and what type of regulation will be appropriate.297 While the question of
whether the state should offer a plurality of institutions is still somewhat
controversial, questions of how to fill in this menu, which values and goals
should be embedded in it, which types of families deserve this recognition,
and whether it is politically achievable are the more difficult ones. Pluralistic
292 Id. at 388.
293 Lifshitz, supra note 5, at 1569 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
294 See, e.g., NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING
ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW : VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 126 (2008) (“A legal
system in a pluralistic society that values all families should meld as closely as possible the
purposes of a law with the relationships that that law covers.”).
295 See, e.g., Aloni, supra note 1, at 613–19 (proposing a flexible registration scheme
that fits diverse types of families).
296 The idea that family law ought to recognize a menu of options for legal recognition
of relationships is not a new one. See, e.g., Weisbrod, supra note 31, at 810 (“One way to
think about a diversity of marital arrangements is to focus on individual contracts. Another
is to think about structured menus, state-offered options, to which individuals give their
consent.”). Further, the idea of a menu of options has already been adopted by several
countries. See, e.g., BOWMAN, supra note 216, at 201–06 (describing the Nether- lands’
approach as “a cafeteria approach to cohabitants’ rights”).
297 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status:
Collaboration and the Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 293
(2015) (evaluating which types of non-married families will be likely to secure recognition by
the state).
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theory offers relatively insignificant guidance for these last questions. 298
Eskridge is right in noting that his pluralistic analysis “do[es] not tell us which
values family law ought to serve, [or] how to prioritize competing values.” 299
Indeed, debates about the content of the menu of options “are enduring
issues for public discourse, and their resolution will depend on the force of
social practice and evolution of public norms.”300
Not only does the elasticity of the theory not offer comprehensive
guidance, but it also presents a tangible risk. As a result of its plasticity, the
menu can be filled in by a few different structures, thus accommodating a
neoclassical approach—or a thin notion of autonomy—while creating a false
fa¸cade of pluralism. This is a genuine risk because pluralistic theory is
immensely susceptible to free-market interpretation. Fundamentally, the
theory proffers that adequate choice allows people to self-govern and, thus,
with some limitations, the state should provide people these options. As
stated by Cass Sunstein, “An understanding of diverse kinds of valuation
helps explain why liberal regimes generally respect voluntary agreements. If
people value things in different ways, the state should allow them to sort
things out as they choose.”301
Once again, the claim is not that pluralistic theory advocates
unrestrained freedom of contract. As stated before, in cases of market
failure, harm to third parties, and opportunistic behavior, pluralistic theory
endorses a system that contains some restrictions.302 But the basic
presumption of validity of contracts makes it especially amenable to the
adoption of principles that vindicate freedom of contract over other values.
Under this view, the adoption of the neoclassical approach and the focus on
contractual instruments as the principle manifestation of family law pluralism
(while the trend is toward diminishing registration schemes) are not merely a
coincidence. They are a manifestation of the autonomy-based approach that
underlines pluralistic theory.
Relatedly, the other risk presented by pluralistic principles is that, while
normatively it is committed to accommodating diverse values, in reality, the
pluralistic system is especially prone to the entrenchment of existing values
and balances, rather than to innovation. As the case of family law pluralism
demonstrates, contract doctrine mostly operates to favor the status quo—

298
Merely saying that a pluralistic approach is not characterized by a hands-off policy
does not solve the problem. Even under Hanoch’s formulation, it seems like family law is
moving toward facilitation of various regulatory regimes that are not necessarily
characterized as “hands-off.” And yet, even active engagement—when focused mainly on
procedural safeguards—can provide too little protection and favor the wealthier party.
299
Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1947.
300
Id.
301
Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779,
849 (1994).
302
Id. (“[E]ven a system that generally respects freedom of contract may block
exchanges on several grounds. Typically such grounds involve some form of market failure
. . . .”).
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hardly a step toward value pluralism. As stated by Jedediah Purdy, “being
constituted by well-established social practices, [Dagan’s pluralistic theory]
tend[s] toward familiar values and balances of value, not radical
innovations.”303 It seems evident in family law that pluralism tends to
entrench existing attitudes rather than to create new ones. Thus—surely
based on many political and cultural reasons—the majority of the new
registrations that were established as a result of the same-sex marriage
debate (civil unions and the like) have been abolished, while the existing
system is composed of familiar contractual principles and committed to the
privatization of dependency. (And, in any event, most of these registrations
were marriagemimic, showing again how pluralism tends to be less
imaginative and more inclined toward entrenching the status quo). If
pluralistic theory had followed the normative orders that are spelled out by
Dagan, the registration schemes should have survived the legalization of
same-sex marriage and modified in a way that enables accommodation of
diverse forms of kinships.
Is a pluralistict theory that provides adequate choice and still maintains a
robust substantive equality and autonomy possible? Such family law is likely
to encounter the barriers, discussed above, stemming from the principles
and rhetoric of pluralism. Yet, to move in this direction, family law ought to
adopt a pluralistic version that is bounded by core values of substantive
autonomy and equality. A vision of what such autonomy looks like is
advanced by Maxine Eichner, who upholds a positive notion of autonomy—
one that demands from the state a more active role in supporting the family,
with specific emphasis on preventing the harm that the market may cause.
Accordingly,
[S]upport for familial autonomy requires more than the state’s
forbearing from dictating family decisions. The state must also seek
to ensure that families have the wherewithal to exercise this
autonomy. Not only does this mean helping ensure that families have
the capacity to make important decisions about their family, it also
means that families have some reasonable means to effectuate their
decisions. While the primary threat to such autonomy has long been
seen to come from the state, much of today’s threats of
encroachment on decision making come from the market.304
A pluralistic vision that follows Eichner’s vision must balance between
fostering individuality, on the one hand, and commitment and
interdependency, on the other. Such a menu of options cannot rely solely on
principles of private rulemaking and on commitments to form over substance.
Rather, such a pluralistic regime requires the introduction of opt-out
mechanisms,

303
Jedediah Purdy, Commentary, Some Pluralism About Pluralism: A Comment on
Hanoch Dagan’s “Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law,” 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR
9, 18 (2013).
304
Maxine Eichner, Beyond Private Ordering: Families and the Supportive State, 23 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 305, 342 (2010).
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change in default rules, different registration schemes (more creative than
simply marriage-by-a-different-name), and rules that prevent opportunistic
behavior and substantive reviews of contracts.
In conclusion, while pluralism offers an intriguing and valuable
perspective for regulation of relationships, the theory, in its current stage, is
insufficient to serve as a primary normative source for the guidance of the
field. Moreover, the plasticity of the theory risks its adoption of laissez-faire
policies under the disguise of autonomy and diversity.
CONCLUSION
Pluralistic theory is “hot” in legal academia, and family law—which has
already started its progression toward offering multiple options—can
generally serve as a laboratory to examine the potential and the pitfalls of
pluralistic theory. The family law laboratory exposes that pluralism is a false
hope and quite oversold. One emerging cautionary tale is that structural
pluralism tends to revolve around principles of private ordering. Unlike some
European countries that created structural pluralism composed both of
registration schemes (civil unions and the like) and contracts (or, as in the
case of the French PACS, a combination of both),305 the emerging U.S.
pluralistic structure relies mainly on contractual elements. Not only is this
pluralism manifested by the expansion of options for private rulemaking, but
also the values underpinning this system are primarily those of the free
market. The manifestations of pluralism under the guise of familiar and
traditional concepts raise the concern that, in practice, pluralistic structure
tends to be non-innovative.
In political science referencing the United States, pluralistic theory—
concisely, the idea that political power is distributed among interest groups—
has been the dominant theory for years.306 The critique of the theory—
primarily that it fails to account for economic inequality in the U.S. and
ignores the way businesses exert influence on the political agenda—has
been so prominent that some scholars suggest that only a new theory, one
that considers questions of economic structure, can serve as a foundation for
political theory.307 Scholars have thus developed a new and relatively
accepted theory titled “neopluralism.”308 Neopluralism “is a more pessimistic
perspective” than classical pluralism in terms of belief in the power of di-

305
The French Pacte Civil de Solidarit´e is an institution that is semi-contractual
semiregistration. For a description of the French PACS, see Aloni, supra note 1, at 632–38.
306
See John F. Manley, Neo-Pluralism: A Class Analysis of Pluralism I and Pluralism
II, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 368, 369–71 (1983).
307
Id. at 382.
308
See, e.g., Alexander Hicks & Frank J. Lechner, Neopluralism and Neofunctionalism
in Political Sociology, in THE HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY: STATES, CIVIL SOCIETIES,
AND GLOBALIZATION 54 (T. Janoski et al. eds., 2005).
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verse groups to influence the political agenda, and provides a normative
framework that recognizes power differences between groups in society.309
Current scholarly accounts in family law have not followed the lead of
political scientists and addressed the connection between distributive justice
and pluralism. This Article shows that, without a particular commitment to
core values that would limit choice, pluralism will likely revolve around
freedom of contract and autonomy. Commitment to distributive justice
requires an embodiment of substantive notions of liberty and equality. To
theorize the connection between pluralism and distributive justice, family law
(and likely private law generally) needs to formulate a theory similar to
neopluralism: one that will maintain and develop choice and accommodate
diverse structures of relationships, but will also be committed to distributive
justice in the broader sense. Such a theory likely involves more than
expansion of the safeguards of fairness by judges; it would entail changes in
the default rules as well, to influence the content of the bargain. How to
promulgate a system that lies at the foundation of pluralistic principles and is
committed to distributive justice, and whether such a system can exist, is an
open question at the moment. But what is clear is that pluralism, and
especially one that stems from a commitment to individual autonomy, cannot
serve as the basis for policymaking in family law.

309

ROB BAGGOTT, PRESSURE GROUPS TODAY 37–40 (1995).

